On the design of public institutions: Evidence from financial supervision
Download full text from publisher
Other versions of this item:
- Volker Nitsch, 2015. "On the design of public institutions: Evidence from financial supervision," Revista ESPE - Ensayos Sobre Política Económica, Banco de la República - ESPE, vol. 33(76), pages 53-60, April.
- Nitsch, Volker, 2014. "On the design of public institutions: Evidence from financial supervision," Darmstadt Discussion Papers in Economics 221, Darmstadt University of Technology, Department of Law and Economics.
References listed on IDEAS
- Dalla Pellegrina, L. & Masciandaro, D. & Pansini, R.V., 2013. "The central banker as prudential supervisor: Does independence matter?," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 9(3), pages 415-427.
- Donato Masciandaro & Marc G Quintyn & Michael W Taylor, 2008. "Financial Supervisory Independence and Accountability–Exploring the Determinants," IMF Working Papers 08/147, International Monetary Fund.
- Caprio, Gerard & D’Apice, Vincenzo & Ferri, Giovanni & Puopolo, Giovanni Walter, 2014.
"Macro-financial determinants of the great financial crisis: Implications for financial regulation,"
Journal of Banking & Finance,
Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 114-129.
- Caprio, Gerard Jr. & D'Apice, Vincenzo & Ferri, Giovanni & Puopolo, Giovanni Walter, 2010. "Macro Financial Determinants of the Great Financial Crisis: Implications for Financial Regulation," MPRA Paper 26088, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- N. Nergiz Dincer & Barry Eichengreen, 2014.
"Central Bank Transparency and Independence: Updates and New Measures,"
International Journal of Central Banking,
International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 10(1), pages 189-259, March.
- N. Nergiz Dincer & Barry Eichengreen, 2013. "Central Bank Transparency and Independence: Updates and New Measures," Working Papers 2013-21, Economic Research Institute, Bank of Korea.
- Marc G Quintyn & Rosaria Vega Pansini & Donato Masciandaro, 2011. "The Economic Crisis; Did Financial Supervision Matter?," IMF Working Papers 11/261, International Monetary Fund.
- N. Nergiz Dincer & Barry Eichengreen, 2012. "The Architecture and Governance of Financial Supervision: Sources and Implications," International Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(3), pages 309-325, December.
More about this item
KeywordsFinancial; Prudential; Supervision; Institution; Authority;
- E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
- G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
- H83 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - Public Administration
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bdr:ensayo:v:33:y:2015:i:76:p:53-60. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Clorith Angélica Bahos Olivera). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/brcgvco.html .
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.