Taxation and Durable-Goods Monopoly: Does a Current Tax Influence Firm Behavior?
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References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
KeywordsMonopoly; Durable-goods; Tax policy; Time-consistency;
- L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
- L21 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Business Objectives of the Firm
- D42 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Monopoly
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