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Tributación sin representación: Argentina desde 1983

Author

Listed:
  • Jorge M. Streb

    (Universidad del CEMA)

Abstract

La Argentina no es representativa ni federal por dos anomalías constitucionales: se viola la representación del pueblo porque las provincias con la mayoría de habitantes (Buenos Aires, Córdoba, Mendoza y Santa Fe) tienen una minoría de representantes en la Cámara de Diputados; la coparticipación de impuestos no se basa en criterios objetivos, equitativos y solidarios, por lo que la provincia de Buenos Aires es pisoteada (recibió un tercio de los recursos por habitante de otras provincias en 2016). Ambas son legados de gobiernos de facto, conservadas por un Congreso no representativo. Se proponen dos reformas: (i) una representación proporcional a la población en la Cámara de Diputados, para acabar con un Congreso donde una minoría decide cuánto tributar y cómo gastarlo; (ii) un régimen de coparticipación basado en repartir los mismos recursos por habitante a todos los distritos: como sería devolutivo si todos aportaran lo mismo, es equitativo; como los distritos ricos aportan más, es solidario. Las reformas son impracticables si Buenos Aires provincia no reclama sin cesar a través de todos los medios legítimos.

Suggested Citation

  • Jorge M. Streb, 2019. "Tributación sin representación: Argentina desde 1983," Ensayos de Política Económica, Departamento de Investigación Francisco Valsecchi, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas, Pontificia Universidad Católica Argentina., vol. 3(1), pages 1-35, Octubre.
    • Handle: RePEc:atw:epecon:v:3:y:2019:i:1:p:1-35
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    File URL: https://erevistas.uca.edu.ar/index.php/ENSAYOS/article/view/2281/2113
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Héctor Cardozo, 2021. "An estimation of expenditure needs for Argentinian provinces: A structural modeling approach," Ensayos de Política Económica, Departamento de Investigación Francisco Valsecchi, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas, Pontificia Universidad Católica Argentina., vol. 3(3), pages 41-75, Octubre.

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • H2 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
    • H7 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations

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