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O Enquadramento Legal do Endividamento Municipal em Portugal

Author

Listed:
  • Flora Cunha Lobo

    (Instituto Superior de Contabilidade e Administração e GOVCOPP, Unidade de Investigação em Governança, Competitividade e Políticas Públicas, Universidade de Aveiro)

  • Pedro Nogueira Ramos

    (Faculdade de Economia da Universidade de Coimbra)

Abstract

O processo da descentralização orçamental envolve um risco potencial de endividamento excessivo dos go- vernos subnacionais, em particular se estes estão sujeitos a uma restrição orçamental fraca (soft budget constraint). Este conceito caracteriza a situação em que a garantia im- plícita de que os governos subnacionais beneficiarão do auxílio financeiro do governo central em caso de ruptu- ra financeira introduz distorções na condução da política orçamental por parte das autoridades subnacionais. A ex- pectativa de que o governo central assuma parte dos cus- tos da despesa e do endividamento excessivos não induz nos níveis inferiores do governo uma gestão prudente das finanças públicas subnacionais (moral hazard problem). Sem o apropriado enquadramento legal, o endividamento público subnacional pode então constituir uma séria ame- aça à própria solvabilidade financeira dos níveis inferiores do governo e à capacidade do governo central em manter a disciplina orçamental e a estabilidade macroeconómica. A nova Lei das Finanças Locais (Lei n.º 2/207) consa- grou profundas alterações no regime jurídico que até en- tão regulava o endividamento dos municípios em Portugal, como uma medida estratégica para assegurar a consolida- ção das finanças públicas e o cumprimento das obrigações do Estado português no que respeita ao Pacto de Estabili- dade e Crescimento. A nova Lei também veio densificar os regimes jurídicos associados à recuperação dos municípios em desequilíbrio financeiro. Neste estudo é feita uma análise dos antecedentes do novo enquadramento legal do endividamento municipal e das inovações introduzidas no que respeita ao conceito e ao modelo de apuramento dos limites de endividamento. Analisa-se também o enquadramento das situações de de- sequilíbrio financeiro.

Suggested Citation

  • Flora Cunha Lobo & Pedro Nogueira Ramos, 2011. "O Enquadramento Legal do Endividamento Municipal em Portugal," RPER, Associação Portuguesa para o Desenvolvimento Regional, issue 28, pages 57-69, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:apd:rper00:y:2011:i:28:id:333
    DOI: 10.59072/rper.vi28.333
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    References listed on IDEAS

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