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Fiscal Rules for Subnational Governments: Can They Promote Fiscal Discipline?


  • Teresa Ter-Minassian


Experience indicates that fiscal rules can be helpful as a disciplinary device at the central government level. This article explores whether fiscal rules could be usefully adopted in a decentralised framework, where the behaviour of subnational governments may undermine fiscal discipline.

Suggested Citation

  • Teresa Ter-Minassian, 2007. "Fiscal Rules for Subnational Governments: Can They Promote Fiscal Discipline?," OECD Journal on Budgeting, OECD Publishing, vol. 6(3), pages 1-11.
  • Handle: RePEc:oec:govkaa:5l4w386d0c9p

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    Cited by:

    1. Carlos Caceres & Serhan Cevik & Ricardo Fenochietto & Borja Gracia, 2015. "The Day After Tomorrow: Designing an Optimal Fiscal Strategy for Libya," Journal of Banking and Financial Economics, University of Warsaw, Faculty of Management, vol. 2(4), pages 32-50, July.
    2. Santiago Lago-Peñas & Jorge Martínez-Vázquez & Agnese Sacchi, 2018. "Fiscal stability during the great recesion: Putting decentralization design to the test," Working Papers. Collection A: Public economics, governance and decentralization 1806, Universidade de Vigo, GEN - Governance and Economics research Network.
    3. Serhan Cevik, 2011. "Policy Coordination in Fiscal Federalism; Drawing Lessons From the Dubai Debt Crisis," IMF Working Papers 11/147, International Monetary Fund.

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