Fiscal Rules for Subnational Governments: Can They Promote Fiscal Discipline?
Experience indicates that fiscal rules can be helpful as a disciplinary device at the central government level. This article explores whether fiscal rules could be usefully adopted in a decentralised framework, where the behaviour of subnational governments may undermine fiscal discipline.
Volume (Year): 6 (2007)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
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