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Análise da Influência de Factores Políticos na Alocação das Transferências Intergovernamentais em Portugal

Author

Listed:
  • Maria Manuel Pinho

    (Faculdade de Economia da Universidade do Porto)

  • Linda Gonçalves Veiga

    (Núcleo de Investigação em Políticas Económicas - Universidade do Minho)

Abstract

Neste estudo recorre-se a uma extensa base de dados, nunca antes explorada, abrangendo todos os municípios de Portugal continental, para o período entre 1979 e 2001, de forma a avaliar o impacto de factores políticos na afectação de transferências aos municípios pelo governo central. Os resultados empíricos revelam que, para além das variáveis que reflectem o nível de desenvolvimento económico e social dos municípios, as variáveis políticas também condicionam o processo de afectação: (1) as transferências aumentam em anos de eleições autárquicas e legislativas; (2) quanto maior o número de anos que um presidente de câmara esteve em funções, maior tende a ser o montante de fundos transferido para o seu município. No entanto, os municípios cujo presidente da câmara pertence ao mesmo partido que o primeiro-ministro não parecem ser favorecidos no processo de distribuição das transferências.

Suggested Citation

  • Maria Manuel Pinho & Linda Gonçalves Veiga, 2004. "Análise da Influência de Factores Políticos na Alocação das Transferências Intergovernamentais em Portugal," RPER, Associação Portuguesa para o Desenvolvimento Regional, issue 7, pages 63-83, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:apd:rper00:y:2004:i:7:id:136
    DOI: 10.59072/rper.vi7.136
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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