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The Evolution Of Individual Property Rights In Massachusetts Agriculture, 17th-19th Centuries

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  • Field, Barry C.

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Suggested Citation

  • Field, Barry C., 1985. "The Evolution Of Individual Property Rights In Massachusetts Agriculture, 17th-19th Centuries," Northeastern Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Northeastern Agricultural and Resource Economics Association, vol. 14(2), pages 1-13, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:nejare:28961
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.28961
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    File URL: https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/28961/files/14020097.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Cheung, Steven N S, 1969. "Transaction Costs, Risk Aversion, and the Choice of Contractual Arrangements," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 12(1), pages 23-42, April.
    2. Libecap, Gary D & Wiggins, Steven N, 1984. "Contractual Responses to the Common Pool: Prorationing of Crude Oil Production," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(1), pages 87-98, March.
    3. Anderson, Terry L & Hill, Peter J, 1975. "The Evolution of Property Rights: A Study of the American West," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 18(1), pages 163-179, April.
    4. Barry C. Field, 1985. "The Optimal Commons," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 67(2), pages 364-367.
    5. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, 1978. "Adjudication as a Private Good," NBER Working Papers 0263, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. repec:cup:jechis:v:31:y:1971:i:01:p:118-125_09 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Johnson, Ronald N & Libecap, Gary D, 1982. "Contracting Problems and Regulation: The Case of the Fishery," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(5), pages 1005-1022, December.
    8. Carlisle Ford Runge, 1981. "Common Property Externalities: Isolation, Assurance, and Resource Depletion in a Traditional Grazing Context," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 63(4), pages 595-606.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    Cited by:

    1. Elinor Ostrom, 1989. "Microconstitutional Change in Multiconstitutional Political Systems," Rationality and Society, , vol. 1(1), pages 11-50, July.

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