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The Innovation of Rules and the Structure of Incentives in Open Access Resources

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  • Carlisle Ford Runge

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  • Carlisle Ford Runge, 1985. "The Innovation of Rules and the Structure of Incentives in Open Access Resources," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 67(2), pages 368-372.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:ajagec:v:67:y:1985:i:2:p:368-372.
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    1. Johnson, Ronald N & Libecap, Gary D, 1982. "Contracting Problems and Regulation: The Case of the Fishery," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(5), pages 1005-1022, December.
    2. Carlisle Ford Runge, 1984. "Strategic Interdependence in Models of Property Rights," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 66(5), pages 807-813.
    3. Easley, David & Spulber, Daniel F, 1981. "Stochastic Equilibrium and Optimality with Rolling Plans," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 22(1), pages 79-103, February.
    4. Daniel W. Bromley & Devendra P. Chapagain, 1984. "The Village Against the Center: Resource Depletion in South Asia," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 66(5), pages 868-873.
    5. Carlisle Ford Runge, 1981. "Common Property Externalities: Isolation, Assurance, and Resource Depletion in a Traditional Grazing Context," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 63(4), pages 595-606.
    6. R. Isaac & James Walker & Susan Thomas, 1984. "Divergent evidence on free riding: An experimental examination of possible explanations," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 43(2), pages 113-149, January.
    7. Amartya K. Sen, 1967. "Isolation, Assurance and the Social Rate of Discount," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 81(1), pages 112-124.
    8. Roth, Alvin E & Schoumaker, Francoise, 1983. "Expectations and Reputations in Bargaining: An Experimental Study," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(3), pages 362-372, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Easter, K. William & Frerichs, Stephen, 1988. "Managing The Great Lakes Commons: An Evaluation Of Recent Institutional Changes," Economic Reports 13019, University of Minnesota, Department of Applied Economics.
    2. Harris, Andrea & Fulton, Murray E. & Stefanson, Brenda & Lysyshyn, Don, 1995. "Working Together: The Role Of External Agents In The Development Of Agriculture-Based Industries," Miscellaneous Publications 31773, University of Saskatchewan, Centre for the Study of Co-operatives.
    3. N. Vink & W. E. Kassier*, 1987. "The ‘Tragedy of the Commons’ And Livestock Farming in Southern Africa," South African Journal of Economics, Economic Society of South Africa, vol. 55(2), pages 107-120, June.

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