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Effect of Quality Standards on the Performance of Agricultural Exports in Cameroon

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  • Ngatsi, Eric Brice Fosso
  • Flore, Demdou Minette
  • Joslanie, Douanla Tameko
  • Noël, Bouopda Guerlais

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to assess the effects of quality standards imposed by developed countries on agricultural exports in Cameroon. Based on the quantification technique of Bora and et al. [1], we have constructed an indicator capturing the quality standards imposed by the developed country partners of Cameroon. The empirical analysis is done by applying the Poisson Pseudo-Maximum Likelihood (PPML) estimator to a gravity model on a panel made up of developed countries importing agricultural products from Cameroon. The results show that, over a study period of 2001-2018, compliance with the quality standards imposed by developed countries is restrictive and has a negative impact on agricultural exports in Cameroon. Thus, a 10% strengthening of quality standards results in a decrease of about 2.83% in the volume of agricultural exports to Cameroon. Given the very demanding nature of quality standards, their compliance can enable the Cameroonian agricultural export sector to become more competitive on the international market. We recommend training and support for producers in order to give them the opportunity to comply with the standards.

Suggested Citation

  • Ngatsi, Eric Brice Fosso & Flore, Demdou Minette & Joslanie, Douanla Tameko & Noël, Bouopda Guerlais, 2021. "Effect of Quality Standards on the Performance of Agricultural Exports in Cameroon," Asian Journal of Agricultural Extension, Economics & Sociology, Asian Journal of Agricultural Extension, Economics & Sociology, vol. 39(6).
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:ajaees:358034
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Nelson, Phillip, 1970. "Information and Consumer Behavior," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 78(2), pages 311-329, March-Apr.
    2. Auriol, Emmanuelle & Schilizzi, Steven G.M., 2015. "Quality signaling through certification in developing countries," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 116(C), pages 105-121.
    3. George A. Akerlof, 1970. "The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 84(3), pages 488-500.
    4. Darby, Michael R & Karni, Edi, 1973. "Free Competition and the Optimal Amount of Fraud," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 16(1), pages 67-88, April.
    5. Ferro, Esteban & Otsuki, Tsunehiro & Wilson, John S., 2015. "The effect of product standards on agricultural exports," Food Policy, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 68-79.
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