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A Game Theory Analysis Of Management Strategies For The Southern Bluefin Tuna Industry

Author

Listed:
  • Klieve, H. M.
  • MacAulay, T. Gordon

Abstract

Game theory offers an alternative approach to standard means of resource assessment which can be of value in the definition and assessment of policy options for competing parties. Using a Nash co-operative game it has been possible in this paper to show the significance of fishing strategies for southern bluefin tuna which take into account the age distribution of the catch. Assuming Japan and Australia act according to a cooperative game then the optimal fishing strategy was found to involve Australia avoiding the fishing of the very young cohorts and Japan taking a moderate catch in subsequent older age classes but not the oldest of the age classes. Sub-optimal strategies were also presented and evaluated along with an indication of the level of biomass associated with different strategies. It was concluded that harvesting policies need to be developed both according to weight of fish harvested and age class.

Suggested Citation

  • Klieve, H. M. & MacAulay, T. Gordon, 1993. "A Game Theory Analysis Of Management Strategies For The Southern Bluefin Tuna Industry," Australian Journal of Agricultural Economics, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society, vol. 37(01), pages 1-16, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:ajaeau:22384
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.22384
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Nash, John, 1953. "Two-Person Cooperative Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 21(1), pages 128-140, April.
    2. John Kennedy & Hanoch Pasternak, 1991. "Optimal Australian and Japanese Harvesting of Southern Bluefin Tuna," Research Papers 1991.02, School of Economics, La Trobe University.
    3. Kennedy, John O.S. & Pasternak, H., 1991. "Optimal Australian and Japanese Harvesting of Bluefin Tuna," 1991 Conference (35th), February 11-14, 1991, Armidale, Australia 145913, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society.
    4. John O.S. Kennedy & James W. Watkins, 1985. "The Impact Of Quotas On The Southern Bluefin Tuna Fishery," Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society, vol. 29(1), pages 63-83, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Ben White, 2000. "A Review of the Economics of Biological Natural Resources," Journal of Agricultural Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 51(3), pages 419-462, September.
    2. Jared Greenville & T. Gordon MacAulay, 2006. "Protected areas in fisheries: a two-patch, two-species model ," Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society, vol. 50(2), pages 207-226, June.
    3. Claire Armstrong & Ussif Sumaila, 2000. "Cannibalism and the Optimal Sharing of the North-East Atlantic Cod Stock: a Bioeconomic Model," Journal of Bioeconomics, Springer, vol. 2(2), pages 99-115, May.
    4. Phil Simmons & Lee Wallace, 1995. "A Comment On Klieve‐Macaulay'S Southern Bluefin Tuna Game," Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society, vol. 39(3), pages 289-291, December.

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