Optimal Capacity Mechanisms for Competitive Electricity Markets
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Cited by:
- Astier, Nicolas & Ovaere, Marten, 2022.
"Reliability standards and generation adequacy assessments for interconnected electricity systems,"
Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 168(C).
- Nicolas Astier & Marten Ovaere, 2022. "Reliability standards and generation adequacy assessments for interconnected electricity systems," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-03756842, HAL.
- Nicolas Astier & Marten Ovaere, 2022. "Reliability standards and generation adequacy assessments for interconnected electricity systems," Post-Print halshs-03756842, HAL.
- Billimoria, Farhad & Fele, Filiberto & Savelli, Iacopo & Morstyn, Thomas & McCulloch, Malcolm, 2022. "An insurance mechanism for electricity reliability differentiation under deep decarbonization," Applied Energy, Elsevier, vol. 321(C).
- Lukas Block & Bastian Westbrock, 2022. "Capacity investments in a competitive energy market," Working Papers Dissertations 95, Paderborn University, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics.
- Peter Cramton & Emmanuele Bobbio & David Malec & Pat Sujarittanonta, 2022. "Electricity Markets in Transition: A Multi-Decade Micro-Model of Entry and Exit in Advanced Wholesale Markets," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series 183, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany.
- Sirin, Selahattin Murat & Camadan, Ercument & Erten, Ibrahim Etem & Zhang, Alex Hongliang, 2023. "Market failure or politics? Understanding the motives behind regulatory actions to address surging electricity prices," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 180(C).
- Bichuch, Maxim & Hobbs, Benjamin F. & Song, Xinyue, 2023. "Identifying optimal capacity expansion and differentiated capacity payments under risk aversion and market power: A financial Stackelberg game approach," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 120(C).
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JEL classification:
- F0 - International Economics - - General
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