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The Decentralized Central Bank: A Review Essay on The Power and Independence of the Federal Reserve by Peter Conti-Brown

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  • Narayana R. Kocherlakota

Abstract

This essay discusses the structure and governance of the Federal Reserve System in light of the many changes in its activities over the past thirty years. Based on this analysis, it argues in favor of four specific reforms: clarification of Congressional expectations for the system; enhanced Federal Reserve Board of Governors transparency with respect to its oversight of the Reserve Banks; stripping monetary-policy votes from the President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and the Boards of Directors of the Reserve Banks; and the initiation of a public conversation about redesigning the Federal Reserve as a unified public entity.

Suggested Citation

  • Narayana R. Kocherlakota, 2017. "The Decentralized Central Bank: A Review Essay on The Power and Independence of the Federal Reserve by Peter Conti-Brown," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 55(2), pages 621-636, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:jeclit:v:55:y:2017:i:2:p:621-36
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/jel.20161406
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Peter Conti-Brown, 2016. "The Power and Independence of the Federal Reserve," Economics Books, Princeton University Press, edition 1, number 10576.
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    Cited by:

    1. M. Cary Leahey, 2018. "The Power and Independence of the Federal Reserve Peter Conti-Brown," Business Economics, Palgrave Macmillan;National Association for Business Economics, vol. 53(2), pages 100-102, April.
    2. Jan C. van Ours, 2022. "How Retirement Affects Mental Health, Cognitive Skills and Mortality; an Overview of Recent Empirical Evidence," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 22-050/V, Tinbergen Institute.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • E44 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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