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The Economics of Rights: Does the Right to Counsel Increase Crime?

Author

Listed:
  • Itai Ater
  • Yehonatan Givati
  • Oren Rigbi

Abstract

We examine the broad consequences of the right to counsel by exploiting a legal reform in Israel that extended the right to publicly provided legal counsel to suspects in arrest proceedings. Using the staggered regional rollout of the reform, we find that the reform reduced arrest duration and the likelihood of arrestees being charged. We also find that the reform reduced the number of arrests made by the police. Lastly, we find that the reform increased crime. These findings indicate that the right to counsel improves suspects' situation, but discourages the police from making arrests, which results in higher crime.

Suggested Citation

  • Itai Ater & Yehonatan Givati & Oren Rigbi, 2017. "The Economics of Rights: Does the Right to Counsel Increase Crime?," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 9(2), pages 1-27, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aejpol:v:9:y:2017:i:2:p:1-27
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/pol.20160027
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • K10 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - General (Constitutional Law)
    • K41 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Litigation Process
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law

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    1. The Economics of Rights: Does the Right to Counsel Increase Crime? (American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 2017) in ReplicationWiki

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