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Noisy Juries and the Choice of Trial Mode in a Sequential Signalling Game: Theory and Evidence

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  • Gerald D. Gay
  • Martin F. Grace
  • Jayant R. Kale
  • Thomas H. Noe

Abstract

In this article we attempt to determine the impact of a defendant's strategic choice of trial mode on the judicial process. In a sequential signalling game setting, we model a criminal trial using varying assumptions regarding the sophistication of the agents, while maintaining the assumption that the information processing of juries is noisier than that of judges. We demonstrate that under certain sets of assumptions, more defendants may choose a jury trial, even though the equilibrium conviction rate is higher. This and other hypotheses suggested by our analysis are tested on a sample of actual trial results.

Suggested Citation

  • Gerald D. Gay & Martin F. Grace & Jayant R. Kale & Thomas H. Noe, 1989. "Noisy Juries and the Choice of Trial Mode in a Sequential Signalling Game: Theory and Evidence," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 20(2), pages 196-213, Summer.
    • Handle: RePEc:rje:randje:v:20:y:1989:i:summer:p:196-213
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    Cited by:

    1. Cho, Yongwon, 2013. "The Effect of the National School Lunch Program on Childhood Obesity," 2013 Annual Meeting, August 4-6, 2013, Washington, D.C. 150758, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    2. McCannon, Bryan C., 2010. "Homicide trials in Classical Athens," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 46-51, March.
    3. Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 1995. "Keeping Society in the Dark: On the Admissibility of Pretrial Negotiations as Evidence in Court," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 26(2), pages 203-221, Summer.
    4. Hylton, Keith N., 2002. "An asymmetric-information model of litigation," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 153-175, August.
    5. Itai Ater & Yehonatan Givati & Oren Rigbi, 2017. "The Economics of Rights: Does the Right to Counsel Increase Crime?," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 9(2), pages 1-27, May.

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