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What Does a Provider Network Do? Evidence from Random Assignment in Medicaid Managed Care

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  • Jacob Wallace

Abstract

Leveraging the random assignment of over 50,000 Medicaid enrollees in New York, I present causal evidence that narrower networks are a blunt instrument for reducing health care spending. While narrower networks constrain spending, they do so by generating hassle costs that reduce quantity, with modest effects on prices paid to providers. Enrollees assigned to narrower networks use fewer of both needed and unneeded services and are less satisfied with their plans. Using my causal estimates to construct counterfactuals, I identify an alternative assignment policy that reduces spending without harming satisfaction by matching consumers with narrower networks that include their providers.

Suggested Citation

  • Jacob Wallace, 2023. "What Does a Provider Network Do? Evidence from Random Assignment in Medicaid Managed Care," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 15(1), pages 473-509, February.
  • Handle: RePEc:aea:aejpol:v:15:y:2023:i:1:p:473-509
    DOI: 10.1257/pol.20210162
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H51 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Government Expenditures and Health
    • H75 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Government: Health, Education, and Welfare
    • I13 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Health Insurance, Public and Private
    • I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
    • I38 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty - - - Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs

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