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The Value of Information in the Court: Get It Right, Keep It Tight*

* This paper has been replicated

Author

Listed:
  • Matias Iaryczower
  • Matthew Shum

Abstract

We estimate an equilibrium model of decision making in the US Supreme Court that takes into account both private information and ideological differences between justices. We measure the value of information in the court by the probability that a justice votes differently from how she would have voted without case-specific information. Our results suggest a sizable value of information: in 44 percent of cases, justices' initial leanings are changed by their personal assessments of the case. Our results also confirm the increased politicization of the Supreme Court in the last quarter century. Counterfactual simulations provide implications for institutional design. (JEL D72, D82, D83, K10)

Suggested Citation

  • Matias Iaryczower & Matthew Shum, 2012. "The Value of Information in the Court: Get It Right, Keep It Tight," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(1), pages 202-237, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:102:y:2012:i:1:p:202-37
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    Replication

    This item has been replicated by:
  • Stephen Hansen & Michael McMahon & Sorawoot Srisuma, 2016. "Estimating Bayesian Decision Problems with Heterogeneous Expertise," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 31(4), pages 762-771, June.

    • More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • K10 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - General (Constitutional Law)

    Lists

    This item is featured on the following reading lists, Wikipedia, or ReplicationWiki pages:
    1. The Value of Information in the Court: Get it Right, Keep it Tight (AER 2012) in ReplicationWiki

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