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Signalling in a Model of Monetary Policy with Incomplete Information

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Cited by:

  1. Sibert, Anne, 1999. "Monetary Policy Committees: Individual and Collective Reputations," CEPR Discussion Papers 2328, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  2. Mervyn A. King, 1996. "How should central banks reduce inflation? conceptual issues," Proceedings - Economic Policy Symposium - Jackson Hole, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, pages 53-91.
  3. Francesco Salsano, 2022. "Monetary policy when the objectives of central bankers are imperfectly observable," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 69(4), pages 396-415, September.
  4. Alex Cukierman & Stefan Gerlach, 2003. "The inflation bias revisited: theory and some international evidence," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 71(5), pages 541-565, September.
  5. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1999. "Political economics and macroeconomic policy," Handbook of Macroeconomics, in: J. B. Taylor & M. Woodford (ed.), Handbook of Macroeconomics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 22, pages 1397-1482, Elsevier.
  6. James Yetman, 2001. "Gaining Credibility for Inflation Targets," Staff Working Papers 01-11, Bank of Canada.
  7. Florin Bilbiie & David Stasavage, 2005. "Incomplete Fiscal Rules with Imperfect Enforcement," Economics Papers 2005-W12, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford.
  8. Beetsma, Roel M W J & Jensen, Henrik, 1998. "Inflation Targets and Contracts with Uncertain Central Banker Preferences," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 30(3), pages 384-403, August.
  9. Cowen, Tyler & Glazer, Amihai & Zajc, Katarina, 2000. "Credibility may require discretion, not rules," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 295-306, May.
  10. Stephen Hansen & Michael McMahon, 2016. "First Impressions Matter: Signalling as a Source of Policy Dynamics," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 83(4), pages 1645-1672.
  11. Daniel Laskar, 2010. "Imprecision of Central Bank Announcements and Credibility," PSE Working Papers halshs-00562595, HAL.
  12. Driffill, John, 1988. "Macroeconomic policy games with incomplete information : A survey," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 32(2-3), pages 533-541, March.
  13. Matthias Neuenkirch & Peter Tillmann, 2016. "Does A Good Central Banker Make A Difference?," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 54(3), pages 1541-1560, July.
  14. Sibert, Anne, 2002. "Monetary policy with uncertain central bank preferences," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(6), pages 1093-1109, June.
  15. Persson, Torsten & van Wijnbergen, Sweder, 1993. "Signalling, Wage Controls and Monetary Disinflation Policy," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 103(416), pages 79-97, January.
  16. Richard Mash, 2000. "The Time Inconsistency of Monetary Policy with Inflation Persistence," Economics Series Working Papers 15, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  17. Alex Cukierman, 2002. "Are contemporary central banks transparent about economic models and objectives and what difference does it make?," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, vol. 84(Jul), pages 15-36.
  18. Bugarin, Mauricio & Carvalho. Fabia A., 2006. "Heterogeneity of Central Bankers and Inflationary Pressure," Insper Working Papers wpe_68, Insper Working Paper, Insper Instituto de Ensino e Pesquisa.
  19. Canavan, Chris & Tommasi, Mariano, 1997. "On the credibility of alternative exchange rate regimes," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 101-122, October.
  20. Sorge, Marco M., 2013. "Robust delegation with uncertain monetary policy preferences," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 30(C), pages 73-78.
  21. Juan Ayuso Huertas, 1991. "Los efectos del anuncio de un objetivo de inflación," Investigaciones Economicas, Fundación SEPI, vol. 15(3), pages 627-644, September.
  22. Damien Besancenot & Radu Vranceanu, 2003. "Credibility costs in the monetary integration game," The Economics of Transition, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, vol. 11(4), pages 727-741, December.
  23. Drudi, Francesco & Prati, Alessandro, 2000. "Signaling fiscal regime sustainability," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(10), pages 1897-1930, December.
  24. Michiel Bijlsma & Roel van Elk, 2008. "Opportunistic competition law enforcement," CPB Discussion Paper 110.rdf, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.
  25. Mervyn A. King, 1996. "How should central banks reduce inflation? - Conceptual issues," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, vol. 81(Q IV), pages 25-52.
  26. Sibert, Anne, 2006. "Is Central Bank Transparency Desirable?," CEPR Discussion Papers 5641, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  27. José A. Rodrigues‐Neto, 2015. "Monotonic Knowledge Models, Cycles, Linear Versions and Auctions with Differential, Finite Information," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 91(S1), pages 25-37, June.
  28. Besancenot, Damien & Faria, Joao Ricardo & Vranceanu, Radu, 2009. "Why business schools do so much research: A signaling explanation," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 38(7), pages 1093-1101, September.
  29. Pierre Gosselin & Aileen Lotz & Charles Wyplosz, 2009. "Interest Rate Signals and Central Bank Transparency," NBER Chapters, in: NBER International Seminar on Macroeconomics 2007, pages 9-51, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  30. Besancenot, Damien & Vranceanu, Radu, 2002. "Manager honesty and foreign investment in developing countries," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(3), pages 231-250, September.
  31. H.P. Grãœner & C. Hefeker, 1995. "Domestic pressures and the exchange rate regime: why economically bad decisions are politically popular?," Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, vol. 48(194), pages 331-350.
  32. Ball, Laurence, 1995. "Time-consistent policy and persistent changes in inflation," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 329-350, November.
  33. Haaparanta, Pertti, 1990. "Whether to join EMS or not: Signalling and the membership," Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers 9/1990, Bank of Finland.
  34. D'Amato, Marcello & Martina, Riccardo, 2005. "Credibility and commitment of monetary policy in open economies," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 21(4), pages 872-902, December.
  35. Esteban Colla de Robertis, 2010. "Monetary Policy Committees and the Decision to Publish Voting Records," Money Affairs, CEMLA, vol. 0(2), pages 97-139, July-Dece.
  36. Allan Drazen & Paul R. Masson, 1994. "Credibility of Policies Versus Credibility of Policymakers," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 109(3), pages 735-754.
  37. Marcus Giamattei, 2022. "Can Cold Turkey Reduce Inflation Inertia? Evidence on Disinflation and Level‐k Thinking from a Laboratory Experiment," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 54(8), pages 2477-2517, December.
  38. Laubach, Thomas, 2003. "Signalling commitment with monetary and inflation targets," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 47(6), pages 985-1009, December.
  39. Bugarin, Mauricio Soares & Carvalho, Fábia Aparecida de, 2020. "Elections, Heterogeneity of Central Bankers and Inflationary Pressure: The case for staggered terms for the president and the central banker," Revista Brasileira de Economia - RBE, EPGE Brazilian School of Economics and Finance - FGV EPGE (Brazil), vol. 74(4), December.
  40. Cripps, M., 1989. "Reputation Effects In Dynamic Games," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 329, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
  41. Daniel Laskar, 2010. "Imprecision of Central Bank Announcements and Credibility," Working Papers halshs-00562595, HAL.
  42. Palmqvist, Stefan, 1999. "Why Central Banks Announce Their Objectives: Monetary Policy with Discretionary Signalling," Working Paper Series 78, Sveriges Riksbank (Central Bank of Sweden).
  43. Weber, A.A., 1988. "The credibility of monetary policies, policymakers' reputation and the EMS-hypothesis : Empirical evidence from 13 countries," Discussion Paper 1988-3, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  44. Horstmann, Ignatius & MacDonald, Glenn, 2003. "Is advertising a signal of product quality? Evidence from the compact disc player market, 1983-1992," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 317-345, March.
  45. Hochreiter, Eduard & Winckler, Georg, 1995. "The advantages of tying Austria's hands: The success of the hard currency strategy," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 11(1), pages 83-111, March.
  46. Bhattacharyya, Indranil & Sensarma, Rudra, 2008. "How effective are monetary policy signals in India," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 169-183.
  47. Zhou, Xi & Chen, Shou, 2021. "FinTech innovation regulation based on reputation theory with the participation of new media," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 67(C).
  48. Roni Frish & Nir Klein, 2002. "Rules versus Discretion – A Disinflation Case," Bank of Israel Working Papers 2002.09, Bank of Israel.
  49. Neuenkirch, Matthias & Tillmann, Peter, 2014. "Superstar Central Bankers," VfS Annual Conference 2014 (Hamburg): Evidence-based Economic Policy 100489, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
  50. Masciandaro, Donato, 2022. "Independence, conservatism, and beyond: Monetary policy, central bank governance and central banker preferences (1981–2021)," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 122(C).
  51. Mr. A. J Hamann & Mr. Alessandro Prati, 2002. "Why Do Many Disinflations Fail? the Importance of Luck, Timing, and Political Institutions," IMF Working Papers 2002/228, International Monetary Fund.
  52. Ilian Mihov & Anne Sibert, 2002. "Credibility and Flexibility with Monetary Policy Committees," Working Papers 232002, Hong Kong Institute for Monetary Research.
  53. Leonardo Melosi & Francesco Zanetti, 2022. "The Signaling Effects of Fiscal Announcements," Working Paper Series WP 2022-38, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
  54. Carlos Carvalho & Tiago Fl´orido & Eduardo Zilberman, "undated". "Transitions in Central Bank Leadership," Textos para discussão 657, Department of Economics PUC-Rio (Brazil).
  55. Naiditch, Claire & Vranceanu, Radu, 2009. "Migrant wages, remittances and recipient labour supply in a moral hazard model," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 60-82, March.
  56. Mihov, Ilian & Sibert, Anne, 2006. "Credibility and Flexibility with Independent Monetary Policy Committees," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 38(1), pages 23-46, February.
  57. Tetlow, Robert J. & von zur Muehlen, Peter, 2001. "Simplicity versus optimality: The choice of monetary policy rules when agents must learn," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 25(1-2), pages 245-279, January.
  58. Francesco Salsano, 2005. "Monetary Policy in the Presence Of Imperfect Observability Of The Objectives Of Central Bankers," Birkbeck Working Papers in Economics and Finance 0523, Birkbeck, Department of Economics, Mathematics & Statistics.
  59. Katsimi, Margarita, 2008. "Exchange rate strategies towards the euro-zone for new EU member states with currency boards," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 1043-1063, September.
  60. Yuxiang, Karl & Chen, Zhongchang, 2010. "Monetary policy credibility and inflationary expectation," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 487-497, August.
  61. Schultz, Christian, 2002. "Policy biases with voters' uncertainty about the economy and the government," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(3), pages 487-506, March.
  62. T. Christopher Canavan, 1995. "Can Ignorance Make Central Banks Behave?," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 291., Boston College Department of Economics.
  63. MAHENC Philippe, 2006. "Lemons are Green: The Informative Role of a Pigovian Tax," LERNA Working Papers 06.05.198, LERNA, University of Toulouse.
  64. Andreas Freytag, 2001. "Does central bank independence reflect monetary commitment properly? Methodical considerations," BNL Quarterly Review, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, vol. 54(217), pages 181-208.
  65. Charles Richard Barrett & Ioanna Kokores & Somnath Sen, 2016. "Monetary policy games, financial instability and incomplete information," Annals of Finance, Springer, vol. 12(2), pages 161-178, May.
  66. Hisashi Sawaki, 2010. "Interaction Between Monetary And Fiscal Authorities Under Incomplete Information," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 61(2), pages 202-217, June.
  67. van Wijnbergen, Sweder, 1991. "Should price reform proceed gradually or in a"big bang?"," Policy Research Working Paper Series 702, The World Bank.
  68. Le Borgne, Eric & Lockwood, Ben, 2000. "Candidate Entry, Screening, and the Political Budget Cycle," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 582, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
  69. repec:zbw:bofrdp:1990_009 is not listed on IDEAS
  70. Chris Canavan & Mariano Tommasi, 1997. "Visibility and Credibility in the Political Economy of Reform," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 346., Boston College Department of Economics.
  71. Nir Klein, 2003. "Reputation and Indexation in an Inflation Targeting Framework," Bank of Israel Working Papers 2003.13, Bank of Israel.
  72. Donato Masciandaro, 2021. "Central Bank Governance in Monetary Policy Economics (1981-2020)," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 21153, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
  73. Kim, Jeong-Yoo & Choi, Hyung Sun, 2023. "Monetary policy, fiscal policy and cross signal jamming," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 75(C).
  74. Marcello D'Amato, 2004. "Commitment of Monetary Policy with Uncertain Central Bank Preferences," CSEF Working Papers 117, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
  75. Weber, A.A., 1988. "The credibility of monetary policies, policymakers' reputation and the EMS-hypothesis : Empirical evidence from 13 countries," Other publications TiSEM 7d95e7bb-efff-41a6-8ea2-b, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
  76. Chortareas, Georgios E & Miller, Stephen M, 2003. "Central Banker Contracts, Incomplete Information, and Monetary Policy Surprises: In Search of a Selfish Central Banker?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 116(3-4), pages 271-295, September.
  77. John G. Riley, 2001. "Silver Signals: Twenty-Five Years of Screening and Signaling," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 39(2), pages 432-478, June.
  78. Matthias Neuenkirch, 2015. "Establishing a hawkish reputation: interest rate setting by newly appointed central bank governors," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 22(5), pages 391-396, March.
  79. José I. Garcia de Paso, 1996. "A partisan model of political monetary cycles," Investigaciones Economicas, Fundación SEPI, vol. 20(2), pages 243-262, May.
  80. Hahn, Volker, 2014. "Transparency In Monetary Policy, Signaling, And Heterogeneous Information," Macroeconomic Dynamics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 18(2), pages 369-394, March.
  81. Haaparanta, Pertti, 1990. "Whether to join EMS or not : Signalling and the membership," Research Discussion Papers 9/1990, Bank of Finland.
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