Why Business Schools Do So Much Research: A Signaling Explanation
AbstractCriticism is mounting on business schools for their excessive focus on research and for neglecting teaching. We show that if students have imperfect information about a school's overall capabilities and if business schools differ in their research productivity, the least productive schools may do as much research as the top-tier ones only to manipulate students' expectations. In turn, the most productive schools might resort to excess research in order to signal their type in the eyes of future students. This signaling equilibrium is characterized by a relative neglect of teaching by the top-tier schools. Such a situation is socially inefficient as compared to the perfect information case.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by HAL in its series CEPN Working Papers with number halshs-00241259.
Date of creation: 17 Jan 2008
Date of revision:
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00241259
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/
Business Schools; Research management; Research policy; Research vs. teaching; Signalling; Imperfect information;
Other versions of this item:
- Besancenot, Damien & Faria, Joao Ricardo & Vranceanu, Radu, 2009. "Why business schools do so much research: A signaling explanation," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 38(7), pages 1093-1101, September.
- Besancenot, Damien & Faria, Joao Ricardo & Vranceanu, Radu, 2008. "Why Business Schools Do So Much Research: A Signaling Explanation," ESSEC Working Papers DR 08002, ESSEC Research Center, ESSEC Business School.
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- I23 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Higher Education; Research Institutions
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Spence, A. Michael, 2001.
"Signaling in Retrospect and the Informational Structure of Markets,"
Nobel Prize in Economics documents
2001-6, Nobel Prize Committee.
- Michael Spence, 2002. "Signaling in Retrospect and the Informational Structure of Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(3), pages 434-459, June.
- Tom Coupé, 2004. "What Do We Know about Ourselves? on the Economics of Economics," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 57(2), pages 197-215, 05.
- Arthur M. Diamond, 1993. "Economic Explanations of the Behaviour of Universities and Scholars," Journal of Economic Studies, Emerald Group Publishing, vol. 20(4/5), pages 107-133, September.
- J. S. Armstrong, 2005. "The Devil s Advocate Responds to an MBA Student s Claim that Research Harms Learning," General Economics and Teaching 0502008, EconWPA.
- Besancenot, Damien & Huynh, Kim & Vranceanu, Radu, 2006. "The "Read or Write" Dilemma in Academic Production: A European Perspective," ESSEC Working Papers DR 06021, ESSEC Research Center, ESSEC Business School.
- Elizabeth Becker & Cotton M. Lindsay & Gary Grizzle, 2003. "The derived demand for faculty research," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 24(8), pages 549-567.
- Spence, A Michael, 1973. "Job Market Signaling," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 87(3), pages 355-74, August.
- David N. Laband & Robert D. Tollison, 2003. "Dry Holes in Economic Research," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 56(2), pages 161-173, 05.
- Hendrik P. van Dalen & Arjo Klamer, 2005. "Is Science A Case of Wasteful Competition?," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 58(3), pages 395-414, 07.
- Besancenot, Damien & Vranceanu, Radu, 2006.
"Can Incentives for Research Harm Research? A Business Schools Tale,"
ESSEC Working Papers
DR 06003, ESSEC Research Center, ESSEC Business School.
- Besancenot, Damien & Vranceanu, Radu, 2008. "Can incentives for research harm research? A business schools' tale," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 37(3), pages 1248-1265, June.
- Siow, Aloysius, 1997. "Some evidence on the signalling role of research in academia," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 54(3), pages 271-276, July.
- Jellal, Mohamed & Faria, Joao & Elaoufi, Noureddine, 2012. "Endogenous dynamic academic research culture," MPRA Paper 38711, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Radu Vranceanu & Claire Naiditch, 2009.
"Remittances as a Social Status Signaling Device,"
- Fouad El Ouardighi & Konstantin Kogan & Radu Vranceanu, 2013.
"Publish or Teach ? : Analysis of the Professor's Optimal Career Plan,"
- El Ouardighi, Fouad & Kogan, Konstantin & Vranceanu , Radu, 2013. "Publish or Teach ? : Analysis of the Professor's Optimal Career Plan," ESSEC Working Papers WP1307, ESSEC Research Center, ESSEC Business School.
- El Ouardighi, Fouad & Kogan, Konstantin & Vranceanu, Radu, 2013. "Publish or teach? Analysis of the professor's optimal career path," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 37(10), pages 1995-2009.
- Carmen Anton & Nelu Florea & Silviu-Mihail Tiþã, 2012. "Comparison Of Scientific Socio-Economic Research Performances In Eastern European Universities," CES Working Papers, Centre for European Studies, Alexandru Ioan Cuza University, vol. 4, pages 636-647, December.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (CCSD).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.