The "Read or Write" Dilemma in Academic Production: A European Perspective
AbstractThis paper investigates the production of research in business and economics. A scholar's income is positively related to the quantity and quality of research. In turn, the quality of a paper depends on the scholar's human capital and the external production of research. The individual scholar is subject to a trade-off between writing more papers or reading in order to upgrade her skills. In the Nash symmetric equilibrium, the quantity and quality of published papers are jointly determined. Under reasonable assumptions about the research production process, in equilibrium researchers write too many papers of a too low quality, as compared to the cooperative outcome. Policy implications can be inferred from the model.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by ESSEC Research Center, ESSEC Business School in its series ESSEC Working Papers with number DR 06021.
Length: 21 pages
Date of creation: Dec 2006
Date of revision:
Incentives for Publication; Congestion Effect; Research Quality; Publications; Research; Research Management;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- A11 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Role of Economics; Role of Economists
- D89 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Other
- M21 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Business Economics - - - Business Economics
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