This paper studies a differential game between authors and editors. Authors maximize the number of publications seeking to increase the impact of their work in the literature. Editors maximize the quality of papers they publish in order to increase the reputation of their journals. The game is suitable to analyze two different scenarios. When journals have different reputations, the editors of the leading journals play as leaders while authors are the followers. When journals have the same reputation, both agents play as followers. A numerical example shows that the outcome of the first case is Pareto-superior to the second whenever editor's put more emphasis on quality vis-a-vis reputation.
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Paper provided by School of Finance and Economics, University of Technology, Sydney in its series Working Paper Series with number
105.
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