Why Business Schools Do So Much Research: A Signaling Explanation
AbstractCriticism is mounting on business schools for their excessive focus on research and for neglecting teaching. We show that if students have imperfect information about a school’s overall capabilities and if business schools differ in their research productivity, the least productive schools may do as much research as the top-tier ones only to manipulate student’s expectations. In turn, the most productive schools might resort to excess research in order to signal their type in the eyes of future students. This signalling equilibrium is characterized by a relative neglect of teaching by the top-tier schools. Such a situation is socially inefficient as compared to the perfect information case.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by ESSEC Research Center, ESSEC Business School in its series ESSEC Working Papers with number DR 08002.
Length: 19 pages
Date of creation: Jan 2008
Date of revision:
Business Schools; Research management; Research policy; Research vs. teaching; Signalling; Imperfect information;
Other versions of this item:
- Besancenot, Damien & Faria, Joao Ricardo & Vranceanu, Radu, 2009. "Why business schools do so much research: A signaling explanation," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 38(7), pages 1093-1101, September.
- Damien Besancenot & Joao Faria & Radu Vranceanu, 2008. "Why Business Schools Do So Much Research: A Signaling Explanation," CEPN Working Papers halshs-00241259, HAL.
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- I23 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Higher Education; Research Institutions
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- J. S. Armstrong, 2005. "The Devil s Advocate Responds to an MBA Student s Claim that Research Harms Learning," General Economics and Teaching 0502008, EconWPA.
- Besancenot, Damien & Vranceanu, Radu, 2008.
"Can incentives for research harm research? A business schools' tale,"
Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics),
Elsevier, vol. 37(3), pages 1248-1265, June.
- Besancenot, Damien & Vranceanu, Radu, 2006. "Can Incentives for Research Harm Research? A Business Schools Tale," ESSEC Working Papers DR 06003, ESSEC Research Center, ESSEC Business School.
- Besancenot, Damien & Huynh, Kim & Vranceanu, Radu, 2006. "The "Read or Write" Dilemma in Academic Production: A European Perspective," ESSEC Working Papers DR 06021, ESSEC Research Center, ESSEC Business School.
- Tom Coupé, 2004. "What Do We Know about Ourselves? on the Economics of Economics," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 57(2), pages 197-215, 05.
- David N. Laband & Robert D. Tollison, 2003. "Dry Holes in Economic Research," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 56(2), pages 161-173, 05.
- Siow, Aloysius, 1997. "Some evidence on the signalling role of research in academia," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 54(3), pages 271-276, July.
- Hendrik P. van Dalen & Arjo Klamer, 2005. "Is Science A Case of Wasteful Competition?," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 58(3), pages 395-414, 07.
- Elizabeth Becker & Cotton M. Lindsay & Gary Grizzle, 2003. "The derived demand for faculty research," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 24(8), pages 549-567.
- Spence, A. Michael, 2001.
"Signaling in Retrospect and the Informational Structure of Markets,"
Nobel Prize in Economics documents
2001-6, Nobel Prize Committee.
- Michael Spence, 2002. "Signaling in Retrospect and the Informational Structure of Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(3), pages 434-459, June.
- Arthur M. Diamond, 1993. "Economic Explanations of the Behaviour of Universities and Scholars," Journal of Economic Studies, Emerald Group Publishing, vol. 20(4/5), pages 107-133, September.
- Spence, A Michael, 1973. "Job Market Signaling," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 87(3), pages 355-74, August.
- Jellal, Mohamed & Faria, Joao & Elaoufi, Noureddine, 2012. "Endogenous dynamic academic research culture," MPRA Paper 38711, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Naiditch, Claire & Vranceanu, Radu, 2011.
"Remittances as a social status signaling device,"
Research in Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 65(4), pages 305-318, December.
- Carmen Anton & Nelu Florea & Silviu-Mihail Tiþã, 2012. "Comparison Of Scientific Socio-Economic Research Performances In Eastern European Universities," CES Working Papers, Centre for European Studies, Alexandru Ioan Cuza University, vol. 4, pages 636-647, December.
- Fouad El Ouardighi & Konstantin Kogan & Radu Vranceanu, 2013.
"Publish or Teach ? : Analysis of the Professor's Optimal Career Plan,"
- El Ouardighi, Fouad & Kogan, Konstantin & Vranceanu , Radu, 2013. "Publish or Teach ? : Analysis of the Professor's Optimal Career Plan," ESSEC Working Papers WP1307, ESSEC Research Center, ESSEC Business School.
- El Ouardighi, Fouad & Kogan, Konstantin & Vranceanu, Radu, 2013. "Publish or teach? Analysis of the professor's optimal career path," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 37(10), pages 1995-2009.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sophie Magnanou).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.