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Signaling in Retrospect and the Informational Structure of Markets

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Author Info
Spence, A. Michael (University of California, Berkeley)

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Abstract

Nobel Prize Lecture

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File URL: http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/2001/spence-lecture.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Nobel Prize Committee in its series Nobel Prize in Economics documents with number 2001-6.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length: 38 pages
Date of creation: 08 Dec 2001
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ris:nobelp:2001_006

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Web page: http://www.nobelprize.org/

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christian Zimmermann).

Related research
Keywords: Signaling; Asymmetric Information;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Claire Naiditch & Radu Vranceanu, 2009. "Migrant wages, remittances and recipient labour supply in a moral hazard model," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00318870_v1, HAL. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Besancenot, Damien & Faria, Joao Ricardo & Vranceanu, Radu, 2008. "Why Business Schools Do So Much Research: A Signaling Explanation," ESSEC Working Papers DR 08002, ESSEC Research Center, ESSEC Business School. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. J. Barkley Rosser, Jr., 2003. "A Nobel Prize for Asymmetric Information: the economic contributions of George Akerlof, Michael Spence and Joseph Stiglitz," Review of Political Economy, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 15(1), pages 3-21, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Habermalz, Steffen, 2003. "Job Matching and the Returns to Educational Signals," IZA Discussion Papers 726, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
  5. Andrew Kashdan and Daniel B. Klein, 2006. "Assume the Positional: Comment on Robert Frank," Econ Journal Watch, Atlas Economic Research Foundation, vol. 3(3), pages 412-434, September. [Downloadable!]
  6. Carnaje, Gideon P., 2007. "Contractual Arrangements in Philippine Fisheries," Discussion Papers DP 2007-22, Philippine Institute for Development Studies. [Downloadable!]
  7. Patrick Duff & David Fryer, 2005. "Market Failure, Human Capital, and Job Search Dynamics in South Africa: The Case of Duncan Village," Working Papers 9624, University of Cape Town, Development Policy Research Unit. [Downloadable!]
  8. Hendrikse, G.W.J., 2003. "Governance of Chains and Networks: A Research Agenda," Research Paper ERS-2003-018-ORG Revision, Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM), ERIM is the joint research institute of the Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University and the Erasmus School of Economics (ESE) at Erasmus Uni. [Downloadable!]
  9. Martina Eckardt, 2007. "Does Signaling Work in Markets for Information Services? An Empirical Investigation for Insurance Intermediaries in Germany," Thuenen-Series of Applied Economic Theory 77, University of Rostock, Institute of Economics, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  10. Jorge M. Streb, 2006. "Job market signals and signs," CEMA Working Papers: Serie Documentos de Trabajo. 326, Universidad del CEMA. [Downloadable!]
  11. Trevon Logan & Manisha Shah, 2009. "Face Value: Information and Signaling in an Illegal Market," NBER Working Papers 14841, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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