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What explains governments interest in artificial intelligence? A signaling theory approach

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  • Fatima, Samar
  • Desouza, Kevin C.
  • Denford, James S.
  • Dawson, Gregory S.

Abstract

Since 2015, several countries have shown significant interest in artificial intelligence (AI) and have released national-level AI strategic plans. These plans reflect the country’s rationale for embarking on AI. To identify what factors influence the AI approach of a country, this study employs the signaling theory to decode strategic national AI plans and understand each country’s rationale. The study adapts the typology of signals and plots AI information given in national AI plans (AI-enabled public services, research, data, algorithmic ethics, governance) in a matrix of intentionality and veracity considering socio-economic and political conditions. Our findings indicate that countries with high democracy scores are more likely than less democratic countries to prioritize ethical and governance issues of AI, however, this is more pronounced in democratic countries with a lower technology base. The results also suggest that advanced research capability and data accessibility for AI is a precondition to developing a nationwide AI system.

Suggested Citation

  • Fatima, Samar & Desouza, Kevin C. & Denford, James S. & Dawson, Gregory S., 2021. "What explains governments interest in artificial intelligence? A signaling theory approach," Economic Analysis and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 71(C), pages 238-254.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecanpo:v:71:y:2021:i:c:p:238-254
    DOI: 10.1016/j.eap.2021.05.001
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Fatima, Samar & Desouza, Kevin C. & Dawson, Gregory S. & Denford, James S., 2022. "Interpreting national artificial intelligence plans: A screening approach for aspirations and reality," Economic Analysis and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 75(C), pages 378-388.
    2. Rongbin Yang & Santoso Wibowo, 2022. "User trust in artificial intelligence: A comprehensive conceptual framework," Electronic Markets, Springer;IIM University of St. Gallen, vol. 32(4), pages 2053-2077, December.

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