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Signaling in Retrospect and the Informational Structure of Markets Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Michael Spence
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Article provided by American Economic Association in its journal American Economic Review .
Volume (Year): 92 (2002)
Issue (Month): 3 (June)
Pages: 434-459
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Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:92:y:2002:i:3:p:434-459Contact details of provider: Email: Web page: http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/ More information through EDIRC
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