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Elections and Market Provision of Information

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  • Bruns, Christian

Abstract

Economists usually think that rational voters have little incentives to acquire costly information. We present a theoretical model to show that, in contrast to this widely held belief, rational voters acquire considerable amounts of information if media technology is available because then they do not condition their informational decisions on being pivotal. The model also shows that the quality of media coverage is inefficiently low because voters have incentives to free-ride. Further, we show how the quality of information depends on the size of the electorate, the prior knowledge of voters and on the technology to produce information. --

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association in its series Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order with number 79857.

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Date of creation: 2013
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Handle: RePEc:zbw:vfsc13:79857

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  15. Aldashev, Gani, 2010. "Political Information Acquisition for Social Exchange," International Quarterly Journal of Political Science, now publishers, vol. 5(1), pages 1-25, April.
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  18. Feddersen, Timothy & Sandroni, Alvaro, 2006. "Ethical Voters and Costly Information Acquisition," International Quarterly Journal of Political Science, now publishers, vol. 1(3), pages 287-311, July.
  19. Santiago Oliveros, 2013. "Aggregation of endogenous information in large elections," Economics Discussion Papers 733, University of Essex, Department of Economics.
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  21. Nicola Persico, 2004. "Committee Design with Endogenous Information," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 71(1), pages 165-191, 01.
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