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Abstention, ideology and information acquisition

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  • Oliveros, Santiago

Abstract

We consider an election in which each voter can collect information of different precision. Voters have asymmetric information and preferences that vary both in terms of ideology and intensity. In contrast to all other models of voting with endogenous information, in equilibrium voters collect information of different qualities. We show that information and abstention are not necessarily negatively correlated: some voters are more likely to abstain the more informed they are. We also discuss the manner in which incentives to acquire information are non-monotonic in terms of both ideology and the level of intensity.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 148 (2013)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
Pages: 871-902

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Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:148:y:2013:i:3:p:871-902

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869

Related research

Keywords: Abstention; Information acquisition; Heterogeneity;

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References

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  10. Nicola Persico, 2004. "Committee Design with Endogenous Information," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 71(1), pages 165-191, 01.
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  12. Coupe, Tom & Noury, Abdul G., 2004. "Choosing not to choose: on the link between information and abstention," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 84(2), pages 261-265, August.
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  15. Hao Li, 2001. "A Theory of Conservatism," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 109(3), pages 617-636, June.
  16. Cesar Martinelli, 2002. "Would Rational Voters Acquire Costly Information?," Working Papers 0210, Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Florian Schuett & Amedeo Piolatto, 2014. "Media competition and electoral politics," Working Papers. Serie AD 2014-03, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
  2. Sourav Bhattacharya, 2013. "Condorcet Jury Theorem in a Spatial Model of Elections," Working Papers 517, University of Pittsburgh, Department of Economics, revised Nov 2013.
  3. Ennio Bilancini & Leonardo Boncinelli, 2014. "Signaling with Costly Acquisition of Signals," Center for Economic Research (RECent) 100, University of Modena and Reggio E., Dept. of Economics.
  4. Cesar Martinelli, 2011. "Ignorance and Naivete in Large Elections," Working Papers 1107, Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM.
  5. Christian Bruns, 2013. "Elections and Market Provision of Information," CESifo Working Paper Series 4091, CESifo Group Munich.
  6. Prato, Carlo & Wolton, Stephane, 2014. "The Voters' Curses: The Upsides and Downsides of Political Engagement," MPRA Paper 53482, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  7. Gianmarco León, 2013. "Turnout, political preferences and information: Experimental evidence from Perú," Economics Working Papers 1364, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
  8. Jens Großer & Michael Seebauer, 2013. "The curse of uninformed voting: An experimental study," Working Paper Series in Economics 64, University of Cologne, Department of Economics.
  9. Santiago Oliveros & Felix Vardy, 2013. "Demand for Slant: How Abstention Shapes Voters’ Choice of News Media," Economics Discussion Papers 734, University of Essex, Department of Economics.

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