IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/zbw/upadvr/v8120.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Can informal redistribution withstand formal safety nets? Insights from urban-rural transfers in Burkina Faso

Author

Listed:
  • Grimm, Michael
  • Hartwig, Renate
  • Reitmann, Ann-Kristin
  • Bocoum, Fadima Yaya

Abstract

Households in rural areas still depend on informal transfers to meet subsistence needs and cope with shocks. Yet, to provide additional monetary support, formal safety nets are increasingly introduced in developing countries. However, it remains unclear whether such social protection policies will have the desired welfare effects. This article addresses this question by analyzing the private transfer response to changes in the income of rural recipients using novel data from Burkina Faso. We assume that the transfer-income relationship is a non-linear one where transfer motives, and therefore also transfer responses, vary with the recipient's position in the income distribution. Our findings support this view. We find a pronounced, negative private transfer response among the poorest of the poor. This observation has important policy implications, because those households that depend most on private transfers, would be most affected by crowding-out effects. In terms of transfer motives, the negative relationship for the lowest income class is consistent with transfers being altruistically motivated. With increasing income levels, transfers cease being altruistic at the margin and switch toward exchange motives. However, the observed transfer pattern is also indicative of an (informal) insurance role of private transfers. Rural households receive higher private transfers in response to negative shocks. These results can serve as a basis for the design of formal social protection mechanisms in a context where informal redistribution still plays an important role.

Suggested Citation

  • Grimm, Michael & Hartwig, Renate & Reitmann, Ann-Kristin & Bocoum, Fadima Yaya, 2020. "Can informal redistribution withstand formal safety nets? Insights from urban-rural transfers in Burkina Faso," Passauer Diskussionspapiere, Volkswirtschaftliche Reihe V-81-20, University of Passau, Faculty of Business and Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:upadvr:v8120
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/224947/1/1733841296.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Ethan Ligon & Jonathan P. Thomas & Tim Worrall, 2002. "Informal Insurance Arrangements with Limited Commitment: Theory and Evidence from Village Economies," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 69(1), pages 209-244.
    2. Townsend, Robert M, 1994. "Risk and Insurance in Village India," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(3), pages 539-591, May.
    3. Ahmed Mushfiq Mobarak & Mark R. Rosenzweig, 2013. "Informal Risk Sharing, Index Insurance, and Risk Taking in Developing Countries," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 103(3), pages 375-380, May.
    4. Mace, Barbara J, 1991. "Full Insurance in the Presence of Aggregate Uncertainty," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 99(5), pages 928-956, October.
    5. Maitra, Pushkar & Ray, Ranjan, 2003. "The effect of transfers on household expenditure patterns and poverty in South Africa," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 23-49, June.
    6. Paxson, Christina H, 1992. "Using Weather Variability to Estimate the Response of Savings to Transitory Income in Thailand," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(1), pages 15-33, March.
    7. Eliana La Ferrara, 2003. "Kin Groups and Reciprocity: A Model of Credit Transactions in Ghana," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(5), pages 1730-1751, December.
    8. Kazianga, H., 2006. "Motives for household private transfers in Burkina Faso," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(1), pages 73-117, February.
    9. Lenel, Friederike & Steiner, Susan, 2017. "Insurance and Solidarity: Evidence from a Lab-in-the-Field Experiment in Cambodia," IZA Discussion Papers 10986, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    10. Lin, Wanchuan & Liu, Yiming & Meng, Juanjuan, 2014. "The crowding-out effect of formal insurance on informal risk sharing: An experimental study," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 86(C), pages 184-211.
    11. Landmann, Andreas & Vollan, Björn & Frölich, Markus, 2012. "Insurance versus Savings for the Poor: Why One Should Offer Either Both or None," IZA Discussion Papers 6298, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    12. Lucas, Robert E B & Stark, Oded, 1985. "Motivations to Remit: Evidence from Botswana," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(5), pages 901-918, October.
    13. World Bank, 2018. "The State of Social Safety Nets 2018," World Bank Publications - Books, The World Bank Group, number 29115, December.
    14. Heemskerk, Marieke & Norton, Anastasia & de Dehn, Lise, 2004. "Does Public Welfare Crowd Out Informal Safety Nets? Ethnographic Evidence from Rural Latin America," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 32(6), pages 941-955, June.
    15. Strupat, Christoph & Klohn, Florian, 2018. "Crowding out of solidarity? Public health insurance versus informal transfer networks in Ghana," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 212-221.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Grimm, Michael & Hartwig, Renate & Reitmann, Ann-Kristin & Bocoum, Fadima Yaya, 2021. "Inter-household transfers: An empirical investigation of the income-transfer relationship with novel data from Burkina Faso," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 144(C).
    2. Nikolov, Plamen & Bonci, Matthew, 2020. "Do public program benefits crowd out private transfers in developing countries? A critical review of recent evidence," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 134(C).
    3. Dean Yang, 2005. "Coping With Disaster: The Impact of Hurricanes on International Financial Flows, 1970-2001," Working Papers 534, Research Seminar in International Economics, University of Michigan.
    4. HwaJung Choi, 2007. "Are Remittances Insurance? Evidence from Rainfall Shocks in the Philippines," The World Bank Economic Review, World Bank, vol. 21(2), pages 219-248, May.
    5. Yang Dean, 2008. "Coping with Disaster: The Impact of Hurricanes on International Financial Flows, 1970-2002," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 8(1), pages 1-45, June.
    6. Hample, Kelsey C, 2021. "Formal insurance for the informally insured: Experimental evidence from Kenya," World Development Perspectives, Elsevier, vol. 22(C).
    7. Kazianga, H., 2006. "Motives for household private transfers in Burkina Faso," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(1), pages 73-117, February.
    8. Renate Strobl & Conny Wunsch, 2017. "Does Voluntary Risk Taking Affect Solidarity? Experimental Evidence from Kenya," CESifo Working Paper Series 6578, CESifo.
    9. Harold Alderman & Christina H. Paxson, 1994. "Do the Poor Insure? A Synthesis of the Literature on Risk and Consumption in Developing Countries," International Economic Association Series, in: Edmar L. Bacha (ed.), Economics in a Changing World, chapter 3, pages 48-78, Palgrave Macmillan.
    10. Kazianga, Harounan & Wahhaj, Zaki, 2020. "Will urban migrants formally insure their rural relatives? Family networks and rainfall index insurance in Burkina Faso," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 128(C).
    11. Fafchamps, Marcel & Lund, Susan, 2003. "Risk-sharing networks in rural Philippines," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 261-287, August.
    12. Kurosaki, Takashi & Fafchamps, Marcel, 2002. "Insurance market efficiency and crop choices in Pakistan," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 419-453, April.
    13. Douglas Miller & Anna Paulson, 2000. "Informal Insurance and Moral Hazard: Gambling and Remittances in Thailand," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1463, Econometric Society.
    14. Felipe Kast & Dina Pomeranz, 2013. "Saving More to Borrow Less: Experimental Evidence from Access to Formal Savings Accounts in Chile," Harvard Business School Working Papers 14-001, Harvard Business School, revised Jun 2014.
    15. Kazianga, Harounan, 2003. "Motives For Household Private Transfers In Rural Burkina Faso," 2003 Annual meeting, July 27-30, Montreal, Canada 21949, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    16. Heath Henderson & Arnob Alam, 2022. "The structure of risk-sharing networks," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 62(2), pages 853-886, February.
    17. Stefan Dercon, 2002. "Income Risk, Coping Strategies, and Safety Nets," World Bank Research Observer, World Bank Group, vol. 17(2), pages 141-166, September.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    private transfers; crowding-out; sharing norms; informal insurance; Burkina Faso;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D64 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Altruism; Philanthropy; Intergenerational Transfers
    • H31 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - Household
    • I30 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty - - - General
    • O12 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:upadvr:v8120. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/fwpasde.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.