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Informal Risk Sharing, Index Insurance, and Risk Taking in Developing Countries

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  • Ahmed Mushfiq Mobarak
  • Mark R. Rosenzweig

Abstract

Preliminary findings are presented from a research project which examined the interactions between informal risk sharing, index insurance and risk-taking. Rainfall insurance contracts were randomly offered to cultivating and landless households in a set of Indian villages where preexisting census data on caste networks allowed the characterization of the nature and extent of informal risk sharing. We study how informal risk sharing mediates the demand for index insurance, whether index insurance or informal indemnification allows farmers to invest in risky technologies, and the general equilibrium effects of offering insurance contracts to cultivators and agricultural laborers.

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File URL: http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.103.3.375
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by American Economic Association in its journal American Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 103 (2013)
Issue (Month): 3 (May)
Pages: 375-80

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Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:103:y:2013:i:3:p:375-80

Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.103.3.375
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  1. Seema Jayachandran, 2006. "Selling Labor Low: Wage Responses to Productivity Shocks in Developing Countries," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 114(3), pages 538-575, June.
  2. Arnott, Richard & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1991. "Moral Hazard and Nonmarket Institutions: Dysfunctional Crowding Out or Peer Monitoring?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(1), pages 179-90, March.
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Cited by:
  1. Ahsan, Syed M & Mahmud, Minhaj, 2011. "Microinsurance: The Choice among Delivery and Regulatory Mechanisms," MPRA Paper 50286, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Jul 2013.
  2. Gharad Bryan & Shyamal Chowdhury & Ahmed Mushfiq Mobarak, 2014. "Under-investment in a Profitable Technology: The Case of Seasonal Migration in Bangladesh," NBER Working Papers 20172, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  3. repec:hal:ciredw:hal-00796528 is not listed on IDEAS
  4. Antoine Leblois & Philippe Quirion & Benjamin Sultan, 2014. "Price vs. weather shock hedging for cash crops: ex ante evaluation for cotton producers in Cameroon," Post-Print halshs-00967313, HAL.

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