Tax return as a political statement
AbstractThe accuracy of a tax return is usually interpreted as an outcome of the tax evasion decision by an individual. However, in non-democratic regimes with predatory blackmail tax systems it is possible that large sums voluntarily reported by influential politicians or businessmen may be used as political statements. By openly acknowledging one's personal income an individual can signal the strength of one's position, or, on the contrary, the submissiveness to the political leadership. In this paper we explore the idea of the tax return as a political statement and test it using a unique dataset of the tax returns filed by the Russian regional governors and the members of their families for the year 2009. Our results conjecture that Russian governors may deliberately file their tax return as a political statement to signal their strength vis-à-vis the central government. --
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Frankfurt School of Finance and Management in its series Frankfurt School - Working Paper Series with number 169.
Date of creation: 2011
Date of revision:
tax compliance; communication in non-democracies; Russian regions;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
- D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy-Making and Implementation
- H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion
- P26 - Economic Systems - - Socialist Systems and Transition Economies - - - Political Economy
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ACC-2011-08-09 (Accounting & Auditing)
- NEP-ALL-2011-08-09 (All new papers)
- NEP-IUE-2011-08-09 (Informal & Underground Economics)
- NEP-PBE-2011-08-09 (Public Economics)
- NEP-POL-2011-08-09 (Positive Political Economics)
- NEP-PUB-2011-08-09 (Public Finance)
- NEP-TRA-2011-08-09 (Transition Economics)
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