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Moral hazard and bail-out in fiscal federations: evidence for the German Länder

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Author Info
Heppke-Falk, Kirsten H.
Wolff, Guntram B.

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Abstract

We identify investor moral hazard in the German fiscal federation. Our identification strategy is based on a variable, which was used by the German Federal Constitutional Court as an indicator to determine eligibility of two German states (Länder) to a bail-out, the interest payments-to-revenue ratio. While risk premia measured in the German sub-national bond market react significantly to the relative debt level of a state (Land), we also find that a larger interest payments-to-revenue ratio counter-intuitively lowers risk premia significantly. Furthermore, with increasing values the risk premia decrease more strongly. This is evidence of investor moral hazard, because a larger indicator value increases the likelihood of receiving a bail-out payment. Quantitatively, the effects are, however, quite small. Our findings are robust to a variety of sample changes. In addition, we provide a case study of the recent Federal Constitutional Court ruling on the Land Berlin, which had filed for additional federal funds. The negative response of the court did not lead to a change in financial markets? bail-out expectations. In sum, our results indicate significant investor moral hazard in the sub-national German bond market. --

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Paper provided by Deutsche Bundesbank, Research Centre in its series Discussion Paper Series 1: Economic Studies with number 2007,07.

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Date of creation: 2007
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Handle: RePEc:zbw:bubdp1:5561

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Related research
Keywords: moral hazard; bail-out; sovereign bond spreads; fiscal federalism; Germany;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems
H6 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt
H7 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations
G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies
G15 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - International Financial Markets
E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Jong-Wha Lee & Kwanho Shin, 2005. "IMF Bailouts and Moral Hazard," International Finance 0501005, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Timothy D. Lane & Steven Phillips, 2000. "Does IMF Financing Result in Moral Hazard?," IMF Working Papers 00/168, International Monetary Fund.
  3. Grossman, S.J. & Miller, M.H., 1988. "Liquidity And Market Structure," Papers 88, Princeton, Department of Economics - Financial Research Center.
    Other versions:
  4. Edwin J. Elton & T. Clifton Green, 1998. "Tax and Liquidity Effects in Pricing Government Bonds," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 53(5), pages 1533-1562, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Hallerberg, Mark & Wolff, Guntram B., 2006. "Fiscal institutions, fiscal policy and sovereign risk premia," Discussion Paper Series 1: Economic Studies 2006,35, Deutsche Bundesbank, Research Centre. [Downloadable!]
  6. Kerstin Bernoth & Guntram Wolff, 2006. "Fool the markets? Creative accounting, fiscal transparency and sovereign risk premia," DNB Working Papers 103, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Carlo A. Favero & Francesco Giavazzi, 2004. "Inflation Targeting and Debt: Lessons from Brazil," NBER Working Papers 10390, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  8. Kerstin Bernoth & Jürgen von Hagen & Ludger Schuknecht, 2004. "Sovereign risk premia in the European government bond market," Working Paper Series 369, European Central Bank. [Downloadable!]
  9. Heppke-Falk, Kirsten & Hüfner, Felix, 2004. "Expected budget deficits and interest rate swap spreads - Evidence for France, Germany and Italy," Discussion Paper Series 1: Economic Studies 2004,40, Deutsche Bundesbank, Research Centre. [Downloadable!]
  10. Gomez-Puig, Marta, 2006. "Size matters for liquidity: Evidence from EMU sovereign yield spreads," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 90(2), pages 156-162, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Dell'Ariccia, Giovanni & Schnabel, Isabel & Zettelmeyer, Jeromin, 2006. "How Do Official Bailouts Affect the Risk of Investing in Emerging Markets?," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 38(7), pages 1689-1714, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Bayoumi, Tamim & Goldstein, Morris & Woglom, Geoffrey, 1995. "Do Credit Markets Discipline Sovereign Borrowers? Evidence from US States," CEPR Discussion Papers 1088, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Lorenzo Codogno & Carlo Favero & Alessandro Missale, 2003. "Yield spreads on EMU government bonds," Economic Policy, CEPR, CES, MSH, vol. 18(37), pages 503-532, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Corsetti, Giancarlo & Pesenti, Paolo & Roubini, Nouriel, 1999. "Paper tigers?: A model of the Asian crisis," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 43(7), pages 1211-1236, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  15. Jan J.G. Lemmen, 1999. "Managing Government Default Risk in Federal States," FMG Special Papers sp116, Financial Markets Group. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Ludger Schuknecht & Jürgen von Hagen & Guido Wolswijk, 2008. "Government risk premiums in the bond market. EMU and Canada," Working Paper Series 879, European Central Bank. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Mark Hallerberg & Guntram Wolff, 2008. "Fiscal institutions, fiscal policy and sovereign risk premia in EMU," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 136(3), pages 379-396, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Sven Jari Stehn & Annalisa Fedelino, 2009. "Fiscal Incentive Effects of the German Equalization System," IMF Working Papers 09/124, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
  4. Peter Claeys & Raúl Ramos & Jordi Suriñach, 2008. "Fiscal sustainability across government tiers," International Economics and Economic Policy, Springer, vol. 5(1), pages 139-163, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. Peter Claeys & Raúl Ramos & Jordi Suriñach, 2007. "Fiscal sustainability across government tiers: an assessment of soft budget constraints," IREA Working Papers 200714, University of Barcelona, Research Institute of Applied Economics, revised Jul 2007. [Downloadable!]
  6. Wolff, Guntram B, 2007. "Schuldenanstieg und Haftungsausschluss im deutschen Föderalstaat: Zur Rolle des Moral Hazard
    [Increasing debt and potential bail-out clauses in the German federation: on the role of moral hazard]
    ," MPRA Paper 11248, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
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