Subnational government bailouts in Germany
Abstract
The paper presents an investigation of subnational government bailouts in Germany. In a first part we briefly describe the fiscal federalism system in Germany. The main part of the paper examines the bailout of two West German states. We identify the causes of the financial trouble of both states and examine the institutional settings that forced the federal government to provide bailout transfers. In addition, we investigate the impact these transfers had on the fiscal performance of both Länder. In a further section we provide evidence on bailouts of local governments by the German Länder. A final section summarizes our results and presents policy conclusions. --Download Info
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Paper provided by ZEI - Center for European Integration Studies, University of Bonn in its series ZEI Working Papers with number B 20-1999.Length:
Date of creation: 1999
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Handle: RePEc:zbw:zeiwps:b201999
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- Kornai, Janos, 1986. "The Soft Budget Constraint," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 39(1), pages 3-30.
- Stuart Landon & Constance E. Smith, 2000. "Government debt spillovers and creditworthiness in a federation," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 33(3), pages 634-661, August.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.Cited by:
- Thiess Büttner & Sebastian Hauptmeier & Robert Schwager, 2006.
"Efficient Revenue Sharing and Upper Level Governments: Theory and Application to Germany,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
1656, CESifo Group Munich.
- Thiess Buettner & Robert Schwager & Sebastian Hauptmeier, 2011. "Efficient Revenue Sharing and Upper-Level Governments: Theory and Application to Germany," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 167(4), pages 647-667, December.
- Buettner, Thiess & Hauptmeier, Sebastian & Schwager, Robert, 2006. "Efficient Revenue Sharing and Upper Level Governments: Theory and Application to Germany," ZEW Discussion Papers 06-13, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
- Ernesto Crivelli & Klaas Staal, 2006.
"Size and Soft Budget Constraints,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
1858, CESifo Group Munich.
- Ernesto Crivelli & Klaas Staal, 2006. "Size and Soft Budget Constraints," Working Papers 2006-13, University of Kentucky, Institute for Federalism and Intergovernmental Relations.
- Crivelli, Ernesto & Staal, Klaas, 2006. "Size and soft budget constraints," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 172, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Lars P. Feld, 2004. "Le fédéralisme financier en Allemagne: Coopération ou concurrence?," Marburg Working Papers on Economics 200416, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
- Emanuel Kohlscheen, 2008.
"Debt Bailouts and Constitutions,"
The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS)
862, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
- Emanuel Kohlscheen, 2008. "Debt Bailouts And Constitutions," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 46(3), pages 480-492, 07.
- Heppke-Falk, Kirsten H. & Wolff, Guntram B., 2007.
"Moral hazard and bail-out in fiscal federations: evidence for the German Länder,"
Discussion Paper Series 1: Economic Studies
2007,07, Deutsche Bundesbank, Research Centre.
- Kirsten H. Heppke-Falk & Guntram B. Wolff, 2008. "Moral Hazard and Bail-Out in Fiscal Federations: Evidence for the German Länder," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 61(3), pages 425-446, 08.
- Baskaran, Thushyanthan, 2012.
"Soft budget constraints and strategic interactions in subnational borrowing: Evidence from the German States, 1975–2005,"
Journal of Urban Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 114-127.
- Baskaran, Thushyanthan, 2011. "Soft budget constraints and strategic interactions in subnational borrowing: Evidence from the German States, 1975-2005," MPRA Paper 32537, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Berthold, Norbert & Fricke, Holger & Kullas, Matthias, 2004. "Mehr institutioneller Wettbewerb in Deutschland: Wirksame Hilfe für die neuen Bundesländer," Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Beiträge 73, Julius-Maximilians-Universität Würzburg, Lehrstuhl für Volkswirtschaftslehre, insbes. Wirtschaftsordnung und Sozialpolitik.
- Breuillé, Marie-Laure & Vigneault, Marianne, 2010. "Overlapping soft budget constraints," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(3), pages 259-269, May.
- Ernesto Crivelli & Klaas Staal, 2013.
"Size, spillovers and soft budget constraints,"
International Tax and Public Finance,
Springer, vol. 20(2), pages 338-356, April.
- Ernesto Crivelli & Klaas Staal, 2008. "Size, Spillovers and Soft Budget Constraints," Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2008_17, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
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