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Waiting for the Invisible Hand: Market Power and Endogenous Information in the Modern Market for Food

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Author Info
Trenton Smith
Hayley Chouinard
Philip Wandschneider () (School of Economic Sciences, Washington State University)

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Abstract

In many ways, the modern market for food exemplifies the economist’s conception of perfect competition, with many buyers, many sellers, and a robust and dynamic marketplace. But over the course of the last century, the U.S. has witnessed a dramatic shift away from traditional diets and toward a diet comprised primarily of processed brand-name foods with deleterious long-term health effects. This, in turn, has generated increasingly urgent calls for policy interventions aimed at improving the quality of the American diet. In this paper, we ask whether the current state of affairs represents a market failure, and—if so—what might be done about it. We review evidence that most of the nutritional deficiencies associated with today’s processed foods were unknown to nutrition science at the time these products were introduced, promoted, and adopted by American consumers. Today more is known about the nutritional implications of various processing technologies, but a number of forces—including consumer habits, costly information, and the market power associated with both existing brands and scale economies—are working in concert to maintain the status quo. We argue that while the current brand-based industrial food system (adopted and maintained historically as a means of preventing competition from small producers) has its advantages, the time may have come to consider expanding the system of quality grading employed in commodity markets into the retail market for food.

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File URL: http://www.ses.wsu.edu/PDFFiles/WorkingPapers/TSmith/invisible021809.pdf
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File Function: First version, 2009
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by School of Economic Sciences, Washington State University in its series Working Papers with number 2009-07.

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Length: 40 pages
Date of creation: Feb 2009
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wsu:wpaper:tgsmith-4

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Related research
Keywords: credence goods; history; food policy; certification;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information
I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
Q18 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Agricultural Policy; Food Policy

References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Masters, William A & Sanogo, Diakalia, 2002. " Welfare Gains from Quality Certification of Infant Foods: Results from a Market Experiment in Mali," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, American Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 84(4), pages 974-89, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Unnevehr, Laurian J. & Jagmanaite, Evelina, 2008. "Getting rid of trans fats in the US diet: Policies, incentives and progress," Food Policy, Elsevier, vol. 33(6), pages 497-503, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Nelson, Phillip, 1970. "Information and Consumer Behavior," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 78(2), pages 311-29, March-Apr. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Crespi, John M & Marette, Stephan, 2001. " How Should Food Safety Certification Be Financed?," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, American Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 83(4), pages 852-61, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. David Cutler & Edward Glaeser & Jesse Shapiro, 2003. "Why Have Americans Become More Obese?," NBER Working Papers 9446, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Smith, Trenton G. & Tasnadi, Attila, 2007. "A theory of natural addiction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 316-344, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Trenton G. Smith, 2004. "The McDonald’s Equilibrium. Advertising, empty calories, and the endogenous determination of dietary preferences," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 23(3), pages 383-413, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  8. Darby, Michael R & Karni, Edi, 1973. "Free Competition and the Optimal Amount of Fraud," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 16(1), pages 67-88, April.
  9. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1986. "Price and Advertising Signals of Product Quality," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(4), pages 796-821, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  10. Inas Rashad & Sara Markowitz, 2007. "Incentives in Obesity and Health Insurance," NBER Working Papers 13113, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Uwe Dulleck & Rudolf Kerschbamer, 2006. "On Doctors, Mechanics, and Computer Specialists: The Economics of Credence Goods," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 44(1), pages 5-42, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Trenton Smith & Christiana Stoddard & Michael G. Barnes, 2007. "Why the Poor Get Fat: Weight Gain and Economic Insecurity," Working Papers 2007-16, School of Economic Sciences, Washington State University. [Downloadable!]
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  13. Schmalensee, Richard, 1982. "Product Differentiation Advantages of Pioneering Brands," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(3), pages 349-65, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  14. George J. Stigler, 1971. "The Theory of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 2(1), pages 3-21, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Alston, Julian M. & Sumner, Daniel A. & Vosti, Stephen A., 2008. "Farm subsidies and obesity in the United States: National evidence and international comparisons," Food Policy, Elsevier, vol. 33(6), pages 470-479, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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