Can Domestic Institutions Explain Exchange Rate Regime Choice? The Political Economy of Monetary Institutions Reconsidered
AbstractRecent articles in International Organization and elsewhere have explored the role of domestic institutions in shaping exchange rate regime choice. These articles use some variation on the information reported by governments to the International Monetary Fund as their dependent variable. Even more recently, new data have become available that reflect actual (de facto) rather than declaratory (de jure) policies with respect to exchange rate regimes. The findings of the domestic institutionalists are significantly weakened, and in some cases reversed, when this more appropriate measure is used to test their claims. These tests cast doubt on whether a domestic institutional focus is the most fruitful way to study exchange rate regimes.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by EconWPA in its series International Finance with number 0505011.
Length: 37 pages
Date of creation: 19 May 2005
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Exchange rate choiche; Political Economy of Monetary Institutions;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- F3 - International Economics - - International Finance
- F4 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2005-05-23 (All new papers)
- NEP-IFN-2005-05-23 (International Finance)
- NEP-MON-2005-05-23 (Monetary Economics)
- NEP-POL-2005-05-23 (Positive Political Economics)
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