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Voice or Public Sector Management? An Empirical Investigation of Determinants of Public Sector Performance based on a Survey of Public Officials

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Author Info
Daniel Kaufmann (The World Bank)
Gil Mehrez (IMF)
Tugrul Gurgur (The World Bank)

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Abstract

Drawing on an in-depth governance micro-survey of public officials within a country, we address empirically the question of the relative importance of the various determinants of governance. We investigate the causes of poor governance, and show that commonly made inferences about policy based on simple correlation can be highly misleading, because the high correlation between the various governance (and public sector management) determinants, as well as the endogeneity in these variables. We find that undue emphasis may have been given in previous work to a number of conventional public sector management variables (such as civil servant wages, internal enforcement of rules, autonomy of agency by fiat, etc.), while undermining the priority due to more ‘external’ (to public sector management) variables, such as external voice, transparency, and politicization. The latter set of ‘voice’-related variables has larger affect on the quality of service and corruption than the more traditional public sector management type of variables. Further work drawing in depth on country-specific surveys in other settings is warranted to ascertain with more confidence whether a shift towards more prominence to transparency and ‘voice’-type of variables is needed, backstopping the results for Bolivia in this paper.

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Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Econometrics with number 0308004.

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Length: 45 pages
Date of creation: 26 Aug 2003
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Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpem:0308004

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C32 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models; Multiple Variables - - - Time-Series Models; Dynamic Quantile Regressions
C42 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods: Special Topics - - - Survey Methods
C81 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Data Collection and Data Estimation Methodology; Computer Programs - - - Microeconomic Data
H32 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - Firm
P16 - Economic Systems - - Capitalist Systems - - - Political Economy of Capitalism
H4 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods
O17 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements

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  1. Benno Torgler & Christoph A. Schaltegger, 2005. "The Determinants of Political Discussion: How Important are Audit Courts and Local Autonomy?," CREMA Working Paper Series 2005-28, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA). [Downloadable!]
  2. Richard M. Bird & Jorge Martinez-Vazquez & Benno Torgler, 2004. "Societal Institutions and Tax Effort in Developing Countries," International Studies Program Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU paper0406, International Studies Program, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University. [Downloadable!]
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  3. Benno Torgler & Friedrich Schneider, 2007. "Shadow Economy, Tax Morale, Governance and Institutional Quality: A Panel Analysis," Working Papers 04-2007, Institute of Local Public Finance. [Downloadable!]
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  4. Benno Torgler & Friedrich Schneider, 2007. "The Impact of Tax Morale and Institutional Quality on the Shadow Economy," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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