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Fiscal Decentralization and Voters' Choices as Control

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  • Alberto Porto

    (National University of La Plata)

  • Natalia Porto

    (National University of La Plata)

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    Abstract

    This paper investigates, empirically, the voters` choices as a mechanism of control of the municipal governments in Argentina. In particular, the paper explores the question of whether voters choose to support the political party in office based on its fiscal performance while in office. After a learning period, citizens vote considering the fiscal performance. The smaller the jurisdiction, the more sensitive the citizens. Voters, in evaluating fiscal performance to take voting decisions, consider the performance in the recent past. Municipal elections are not a mere rehearsal of national or provincial elections. We conclude that we can trust in fiscal decentralization and voting. Perhaps, it is a better option than fiscal centralization.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Universidad del CEMA in its journal Journal of Applied Economics.

    Volume (Year): III (2000)
    Issue (Month): (May)
    Pages: 135-167

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    Handle: RePEc:cem:jaecon:v:3:y:2000:n:1:p:135-167

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    Related research

    Keywords: fiscal decentralization; local governments; fiscal performance; voters' choices;

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    Cited by:
    1. Fabio Alvim Klein, 2014. "Do Opportunistic And Partisan Fiscalcycles Come Together?," Anais do XL Encontro Nacional de Economia [Proceedings of the 40th Brazilian Economics Meeting] 060, ANPEC - Associação Nacional dos Centros de Pósgraduação em Economia [Brazilian Association of Graduate Programs in Economics].
    2. José Carlos Ferreira Da Silva & Vander Mendes Lucas & Moisés De Andrade Resende Filho, 2014. "Royalties Do Petróleo E Eleições Municipais: O Caso Brasileiro," Anais do XLI Encontro Nacional de Economia [Proceedings of the 41th Brazilian Economics Meeting] 078, ANPEC - Associação Nacional dos Centros de Pósgraduação em Economia [Brazilian Association of Graduate Programs in Economics].
    3. Alberto Porto, 2004. "Finanzas Públicas Locales en la Argentina," Department of Economics, Working Papers 057, Departamento de Economía, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas, Universidad Nacional de La Plata.
    4. World Bank, 2003. "Decentralizing Indonesia : A Regional Public Expenditure Review Overview Report," World Bank Other Operational Studies 14632, The World Bank.

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