In this paper the firm is analyzed and modeled as a set of different subcoalitions (agents) each with their own objectives. It examines how the goals can be conflicting and in turn how this influences the payoff structure of the subcoalitions given that they follow 'simple' decision rules, i.e. rules of thumb. This implies that the subcoalitions act in aboundedly rational way. To see how these decision making procedures evolve we make use of an (evolutionary) dynamic game theoretical framework. Consequently, the main aim is to address the issue of modeling the dynamic and adaptive nature of the subcoalitions.
Download Info
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Publisher Info
Paper provided by International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis in its series Working Papers with number
ir99036.
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Itzhak Gilboa & David Schmeidler, 1992.
"Case-Based Decision Theory,"
Discussion Papers
994, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
[Downloadable!]
Itzhak Gilboa & David Schmeidler, 1993.
"Case-Based Consumer Theory,"
Discussion Papers
1025, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
[Downloadable!]
Itzhak Gilboa & David Schmeidler, 1993.
"Case-Based Optimization,"
Discussion Papers
1039, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
[Downloadable!]