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Case-Based Optimization

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Author Info
Itzhak Gilboa
David Schmeidler

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Abstract

Case-based Decision Theory (CBDT) suggests that decisions under ucnertainty are made by analogies to previously-encountered problems. The theory postulates a similarity function over decision problems and a utility functionon outcomes, such that acts are evaluated by a similarity-weighted sum of the utility othey yielded in past cases in which they were chosen. It gives rise to the concept of "aspiration level" in the following sense: if this level is attained by some acts, the decision will only choose among them, and will not even experiment withothers. Thus a case-based decision maker may be "satisficed" with a choice, and will not maximize his/her utility function even if the "same" problem is encountered over and over again. In this paper we discuss the process by which the aspiration level is updated. An adjustment rule is "realistic" if the aspiration level is (almost always) set to be an average of its previous value and the best average-performance so far encountered. It is "ambitious" if at least one of the following holds: (i) the initial aspiration level is set at a high level, or (ii) the aspiration level is set to exceed the maximal average performance by some constant infinitely often. While we propose realistic-but-ambitious adjustment rules for decision under uncertainty at large, we focus here on the case in which the decision maker is repeatedly faced with the "same" problem, assuming that each choice yields an independent realization of a given random variable. We show that if the adjustment rule is realistic-but-ambitious in the sense of (i), then with arbitrarily high probability the decision maker will asymptotically choose only expected-utility maximizing acts. Ambitiousess in the sense of (ii) above guarantees the same result with probability 1, and for all underlying payoff distributions. Hence, case-based decision makers who are both ambitious and realistic will "learn" to be expected-utility maximizers, provided that the decision problem is repeated long enough.

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Paper provided by Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science in its series Discussion Papers with number 1039.

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Date of creation: Apr 1993
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Handle: RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1039

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Kandori, Michihiro & Mailath, George J & Rob, Rafael, 1993. "Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 29-56, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Itzhak Gilboa & David Schmeidler, 1992. "Case-Based Decision Theory," Discussion Papers 994, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Itzhak Gilboa & David Schmeidler, 1993. "Case-Based Consumer Theory," Discussion Papers 1025, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Steffen Huck & Rajiv Sarin, 2000. "Players with Limited Memory," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1645, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Tilman Slembeck, 1999. "Low Information Games - Experimental Evidence on Learning in Ultimatum Bargaining," Experimental 9905001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  3. Itzhak Gilboa & David Schmeidler, 1995. "Case-Based Knowledge and Planning," Discussion Papers 1127, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  4. F. de Vries, 1999. "The Behavioral Firm and Its Internal Game: Evolutionary Dynamics of Decision Making," Working Papers ir99036, International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis. [Downloadable!]
  5. Mikhael Shor, 2003. "Learning to Respond: The Use of Heuristics in Dynamic Games," Game Theory and Information 0301001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  6. Ilan Eshel & Larry Samuelson & Avner Shaked, . "Altruists Egoists and Hooligans in a Local Interaction Model," ELSE working papers 005, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution. [Downloadable!]
  7. Ken Binmore & Larry Samuelson, . "Muddling Through: Moisy Equlibrium Selection," ELSE working papers 036, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution. [Downloadable!]
  8. Guerdjikova, Ani, 2004. "A Note on Case-Based Optimization with a Non-Degenerate Similarity Function," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 04-46, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim & Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim. [Downloadable!]
  9. Guerdjikova, Ani, 2004. "Preference for Diversification with Similarity Considerations," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 04-48, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim & Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim. [Downloadable!]
  10. Atanasios Mitropoulos, 2001. "Little Information, Efficiency, and Learning - An Experimental Study," Game Theory and Information 0110002, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  11. Friederike Mengel, 2007. "Learning Across Games," Working Papers. Serie AD 2007-05, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie). [Downloadable!]
  12. Amit Pazgal, 1995. "Satisficing Leads to Cooperation in Mutual Interests Games," Discussion Papers 1126, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  13. David Schmeidler & Itzhak Gilboa, 1994. "Reaction to Price Changes and Aspiration Level Adjustments," Working Papers 023, Ohio State University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  14. Tilman Börgers & Rajiv Sarin, . "Naive Reinforcement Learning With Endogenous Aspiration," ELSE working papers 037, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution. [Downloadable!]
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