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Learning in Potential Games

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Author Info
Y.M. Ermoliev
S.D. Flam

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Abstract

We consider repeated play of so-called potential games. Numerous modes of play are shown to yield Nash equilibrium in the long run. We point to procedures that can account for society-wide constraints concerning efficiency.

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Paper provided by International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis in its series Working Papers with number ir97022.

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Date of creation: Jun 1997
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Handle: RePEc:wop:iasawp:ir97022

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Vega-Redondo Fernando, 1993. "Competition and Culture in an Evolutionary Process of Equilibrium Selection: A Simple Example," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(4), pages 618-631, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Foster, Dean P. & Young, H. Peyton, 1998. "On the Nonconvergence of Fictitious Play in Coordination Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 79-96, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Flam, Sjur Didrik, 1996. "Approaches to economic equilibrium," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 20(9-10), pages 1505-1522. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Sjostrom, Tomas & Weitzman, Martin L., 1996. "Competition and the evolution of efficiency," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 25-43, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1996. "The Theory of Learning in Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 624, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
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  1. F. de Vries, 1999. "The Behavioral Firm and Its Internal Game: Evolutionary Dynamics of Decision Making," Working Papers ir99036, International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis. [Downloadable!]
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