Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Market Discipline and Deposit Insurance Reform in Japan

Contents:

Author Info

  • Masami Imai

    ()
    (Economics and East Asian Studies, Wesleyan University)

Registered author(s):

    Abstract

    On April 1, 2002, the Japanese government lifted a blanket guarantee of all deposits and began limiting the coverage of time deposits. This paper uses this deposit insurance reform as a natural experiment to investigate the relationship between deposit insurance coverage and market discipline. I find that the reform raised the sensitivity of interest rates on deposits, and that of deposit quantity to default risk. In addition, the interest rate differentials between partially insured large time deposits and fully insured ordinary deposits increased for risky banks. These results suggest that the deposit insurance reform enhanced market discipline in Japan. I also find that too-big-to-fail (TBTF) policy became a more important determinant of interest rates and deposit allocation after the reform, thereby partially offsetting the positive effects of the deposit insurance reform on overall market discipline.

    Download Info

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
    File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2006.01.009
    Our checks indicate that this address may not be valid because: 503 Service Unavailable (http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2006.01.009 [303 See Other]--> http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S037842660600135X [301 Moved Permanently]--> http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/articleSelectSinglePerm?Redirect=http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S037842660600135X?via%3Dihub [301 Moved Permanently]--> http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S037842660600135X?via=ihub). If this is indeed the case, please notify (Manolis Kaparakis)
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Wesleyan University, Department of Economics in its series Wesleyan Economics Working Papers with number 2006-007.

    as in new window
    Length: 32 pages
    Date of creation: Jan 2006
    Date of revision:
    Publication status: Published in the Journal of Banking and Finance (Volume 30, Issue 12 , December 2006, Pages 3433-3452)
    Handle: RePEc:wes:weswpa:2006-007

    Contact details of provider:
    Postal: PAC 123, 238 Church Street, Middletown, CT 06459-0007
    Phone: (860)685-2340
    Fax: (860)685-2781
    Web page: http://www.wesleyan.edu/econ/
    More information through EDIRC

    Related research

    Keywords: Deposit Insurance; Market Discipline; Japanese Banks;

    Find related papers by JEL classification:

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    References

    References listed on IDEAS
    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
    as in new window
    1. Martinez Peria, Maria Soledad & Schmukler, Sergio L., 1999. "Do depositors punish banks for"bad"behavior? : market discipline in Argentina, Chile, and Mexico," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2058, The World Bank.
    2. Joe Peek & Eric S. Rosengren, 2003. "Unnatural Selection: Perverse Incentives and the Misallocation of Credit in Japan," NBER Working Papers 9643, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Hovakimian, Armen & Kane, Edward J. & Laeven, Luc, 2002. "How Country and Safety-Net Characteristics Affect Bank Risk-Shifting," CEI Working Paper Series 2002-10, Center for Economic Institutions, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
    4. Daniel M. Covitz & Paul Harrison, 2003. "Testing conflicts of interest at bond rating agencies with market anticipation: evidence that reputation incentives dominate," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2003-68, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    5. Thomas Mondschean & Timothy Opiela, 1999. "Bank Time Deposit Rates and Market Discipline in Poland: The Impact of State Ownership and Deposit Insurance Reform," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer, vol. 15(3), pages 179-196, May.
    6. Joe Peek & Eric S. Rosengren, 1998. "Determinants of the Japan premium: actions speak louder than words," Working Papers 98-9, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.
    7. María Soledad Martínez-Peria & Sergio Schmukler, 2002. "Do Depositors Punish Banks for Bad Behavior? Market Discipline, Deposit Insurance, and Banking Crises," Central Banking, Analysis, and Economic Policies Book Series, in: Leonardo Hernández & Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel & Norman Loayza (Series Editor) & Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel (S (ed.), Banking, Financial Integration, and International Crises, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 5, pages 143-174 Central Bank of Chile.
    8. Sironi, Andrea, 2002. "Strengthening banks' market discipline and leveling the playing field: Are the two compatible?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 26(5), pages 1065-1091, May.
    9. Wheelock, David C & Kumbhakar, Subal C, 1995. "Which Banks Choose Deposit Insurance? Evidence of Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard in a Voluntary Insurance System," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 27(1), pages 186-201, February.
    10. Demirguc-Kunt, Asli & Detragiache, Enrica, 1999. "Does deposit insurance increase banking system stability ? An empirical investigation," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2247, The World Bank.
    11. Calomiris, Charles W., 1999. "Building an incentive-compatible safety net," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 23(10), pages 1499-1519, October.
    12. Demirguc-Kunt, Asli & Huizinga, Harry, 2004. "Market discipline and deposit insurance," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 375-399, March.
    13. Takatoshi Ito & Kimie Harada, 2005. "Japan premium and stock prices: two mirrors of Japanese banking crises," International Journal of Finance & Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 10(3), pages 195-211.
    14. Kaufman, George G., 2002. "Too big to fail in banking: What remains?," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 42(3), pages 423-436.
    15. Calomiris, Charles W., 1990. "Is Deposit Insurance Necessary? A Historical Perspective," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 50(02), pages 283-295, June.
    16. Mark M. Spiegel & Nobuyoshi Yamori, 2004. "The Evolution Of Bank Resolution Policies In Japan: Evidence From Market Equity Values," Journal of Financial Research, Southern Finance Association;Southwestern Finance Association, vol. 27(1), pages 115-132.
    17. Mark M. Spiegel & Nobuyoshi Yamori, 2000. "The evolution of "too-big-to-fail" policy in Japan: evidence from market equity values," Pacific Basin Working Paper Series 00-01, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
    18. Cook, Douglas O & Spellman, Lewis J, 1994. "Repudiation Risk and Restitution Costs: Toward Understanding Premiums on Insured Deposits," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 26(3), pages 439-59, August.
    19. Honohan, Patrick & Klingebiel, Daniela, 2003. "The fiscal cost implications of an accommodating approach to banking crises," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 27(8), pages 1539-1560, August.
    20. Covrig, Vicentiu & Low, Buen Sin & Melvin, Michael, 2004. "A Yen is Not a Yen: TIBOR/LIBOR and the Determinants of the Japan Premium," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 39(01), pages 193-208, March.
    21. David C. Wheelock & Subal C. Kumbhaker, 1992. "The slack banker dances: deposit insurance and risk-taking in the banking collapse of the 1920s," Working Papers 1992-002, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
    22. Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, 2000. "Bank runs, deposit insurance, and liquidity," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, issue Win, pages 14-23.
    23. Sironi, Andrea, 2003. " Testing for Market Discipline in the European Banking Industry: Evidence from Subordinated Debt Issues," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 35(3), pages 443-72, June.
    24. Frederick T. Furlong & Michael C. Keeley, 1991. "Capital regulation and bank risk-taking: a note (reprinted from Journal of Banking and Finance)," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, issue Sum, pages 34-39.
    25. Mitsuhiro Fukao, 2002. "Financial Sector Profitability and Double-Gearing," NBER Working Papers 9368, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    26. Furlong, Frederick T. & Keeley, Michael C., 1989. "Capital regulation and bank risk-taking: A note," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 13(6), pages 883-891, December.
    27. Merton, Robert C., 1977. "An analytic derivation of the cost of deposit insurance and loan guarantees An application of modern option pricing theory," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 3-11, June.
    28. Keiko Murata & Masahiro Hori, 2006. "Do Small Depositors Exit From Bad Banks? Evidence From Small Financial Institutions In Japan," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 57(2), pages 260-278.
    29. Flannery, Mark J, 1998. "Using Market Information in Prudential Bank Supervision: A Review of the U.S. Empirical Evidence," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 30(3), pages 273-305, August.
    30. Wheelock, David C & Wilson, Paul W, 1995. "Explaining Bank Failures: Deposit Insurance, Regulation, and Efficiency," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 77(4), pages 689-700, November.
    31. Douglas D. Evanoff & Larry D. Wall, 2001. "Reforming Bank Capital Regulation: Using Subordinated Debt To Enhance Market And Supervisory Discipline," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 19(4), pages 444-453, October.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as in new window

    Cited by:
    1. De Giuli, Maria Elena & Maggi, Mario Alessandro & Paris, Francesco Maria, 2009. "Deposit guarantee evaluation and incentives analysis in a mutual guarantee system," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 33(6), pages 1058-1068, June.
    2. Guizani, Brahim, 2010. "Regulation Policy And Credit Crunch: Evidence From Japan," MPRA Paper 46827, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 08 May 2013.
    3. Hakenes, Hendrik & Schnabel, Isabel, 2004. "Banks without Parachutes -- Competitive Effects of Government Bail-out Policies," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 04-53, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim;Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
    4. Brahim Guizani & Wako Watanabe, 2010. "The Deposit Insurance and the Risk-Shifting Incentive Evidence from the Blanket Deposit Insurance in Japan," Keio/Kyoto Joint Global COE Discussion Paper Series 2010-004, Keio/Kyoto Joint Global COE Program.
    5. Masami Imai, 2008. "Crowding-Out Effects of a Government-Owned Depository Institution: Evidence from a Natural Experiment in Japan," Wesleyan Economics Working Papers 2008-003, Wesleyan University, Department of Economics.
    6. Baba, Naohiko & Inada, Masakazu, 2009. "Why do Japanese regional banks issue subordinated debts?," Japan and the World Economy, Elsevier, vol. 21(4), pages 358-364, December.
    7. Emmanuelle Nys & Amine Tarazi & Irwan Trinugroho, 2013. "Political Connections, Bank Deposits, and Formal Deposit Insurance: Evidence from an Emerging Economy," Working Papers hal-00916513, HAL.
    8. Uchida, Hirofumi & Satake, Mitsuhiko, 2009. "Market discipline and bank efficiency," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 19(5), pages 792-802, December.
    9. M. Disli & K. Schoors, 2013. "Bank rebranding and depositor loyalty," Working Papers of Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Ghent University, Belgium 13/867, Ghent University, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration.
    10. Imai, Masami & Takarabe, Seitaro, 2011. "Transmission of liquidity shock to bank credit: Evidence from the deposit insurance reform in Japan," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 143-156, June.
    11. Pop, Adrian & Pop, Diana, 2009. "Requiem for market discipline and the specter of TBTF in Japanese banking," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 49(4), pages 1429-1459, November.
    12. Shimizu, Katsutoshi, 2009. "Is the information produced in the stock market useful for depositors?," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 6(1), pages 34-39, March.

    Lists

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wes:weswpa:2006-007. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Manolis Kaparakis).

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.