Reforming Bank Capital Regulation: Using Subordinated Debt To Enhance Market And Supervisory Discipline
AbstractIn 1988 the Basel Capital Accord introduced minimum risk-weighted capital requirements for internationally active banks. In recent years there has been a growing realization that there are significant problems with the capital guidelines. As financial firms have become more sophisticated and complex they have effectively arbitraged the requirements and have become so good at it that the regulations have essentially ceased being a safety and soundness issue for supervisors and have become more of a compliance issue. Indeed, the Basel Committee is now evaluating reforms to the capital accord and is considering various means to improve the risk-capital relationship and to increase the role of market discipline. The authors argue that many of the problems that currently exist can be addressed, and some additional benefits not previously possible under the current capital guidelines can be realized, by increasing the role of subordinated debt in the bank capital structure. The authors discuss the potential benefits and offer a capital reform proposal that would improve both market and supervisory oversight. This should lead to more prudent risk management behavior by the larger, more complex banking organizations, resulting in a safer industry with less potential for systemic problems. Copyright 2001 Western Economic Association International.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Western Economic Association International in its journal Contemporary Economic Policy.
Volume (Year): 19 (2001)
Issue (Month): 4 (October)
Contact details of provider:
Postal: 18830 Brookhurst Street, Suite 304, Fountain Valley, CA 92708 USA
Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=1074-3529
More information through EDIRC
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Masami Imai, 2006. "Market Discipline and Deposit Insurance Reform in Japan," Wesleyan Economics Working Papers, Wesleyan University, Department of Economics 2006-007, Wesleyan University, Department of Economics.
- Masami Imai, 2006. "The Emergence of Market Monitoring in Japanese Banks: Evidence from the Subordinated Debt Market," Wesleyan Economics Working Papers, Wesleyan University, Department of Economics 2006-008, Wesleyan University, Department of Economics.
- Imai, Masami, 2006. "Market discipline and deposit insurance reform in Japan," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 30(12), pages 3433-3452, December.
- John, Kose & Mehran, Hamid & Qian, Yiming, 2010. "Outside monitoring and CEO compensation in the banking industry," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 16(4), pages 383-399, September.
- Kose John & Hamid Mehran & Yiming Qian, 2007. "Regulation, subordinated debt, and incentive features of CEO compensation in the banking industry," Staff Reports, Federal Reserve Bank of New York 308, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
- Imai, Masami, 2007. "The emergence of market monitoring in Japanese banks: Evidence from the subordinated debt market," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 31(5), pages 1441-1460, May.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing) or (Christopher F. Baum).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.