The Efficiency of a Group-Specific Mandated Benefit Revisited: The Effect of Infertility Mandates
AbstractThis paper examines the labor market effects of state health insurance mandates that increase the cost of employing a demographically identifiable group. State mandates requiring that health insurance plans cover infertility treatment raise the relative cost of insuring older women of child-bearing age. Empirically, wages in this group are unaffected, but their total labor input decreases. Workers do not value infertility mandates at cost, and so will not take wage cuts in exchange, leading employers to decrease their demand for this affected and identifiable group. Differences in the empirical effects of mandates found in the literature are explained by a model including variations in the elasticity of demand, moral hazard, ability to identify a group, and adverse selection.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research in its series Upjohn Working Papers and Journal Articles with number 11-175.
Date of creation: May 2011
Date of revision:
labor supply; infertility; health insurance; health insurance mandates;
Other versions of this item:
- Joanna N. Lahey, 2012. "The efficiency of a group‐specific mandated benefit revisited: The effect of infertility mandates," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 31(1), pages 63-92, December.
- I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
- J23 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Labor Demand
- J13 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Fertility; Family Planning; Child Care; Children; Youth
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-06-11 (All new papers)
- NEP-IAS-2011-06-11 (Insurance Economics)
- NEP-LAB-2011-06-11 (Labour Economics)
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- Bailey, James, 2013. "Who pays for obesity? Evidence from health insurance benefit mandates," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 121(2), pages 287-289.
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