On Take It or Leave It Offers in Common Agency
AbstractIf the agent's preference relation satisfies a strict monotonicity condition in common agency under the asymmetric information, the set of all equilibrium allocations in the menu game where menus of contracts are allowed coincides with the set of all equilibrium allocations in the single contract game where only single contracts are allowed.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Vancouver School of Economics in its series Microeconomics.ca working papers with number seungjin_han-2011-11.
Length: 10 pages
Date of creation: 26 May 2011
Date of revision: 30 Aug 2012
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Web page: http://www.economics.ubc.ca/
take it or leave it offers; menus; common agency; robust equilibrium allocations; mixed-strategy equilibrium;
Other versions of this item:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
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