Debt, Managers and Cartels
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More about this item
Keywords
Bankruptcy; capital structure; collusion; corporate governance; credit markets; disclosure rules; financial regulation; managerial incentives; product market competition.;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
- G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-BAN-2014-06-14 (Banking)
- NEP-BEC-2014-06-14 (Business Economics)
- NEP-COM-2014-06-14 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-LAW-2014-06-14 (Law and Economics)
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