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Corporate Financing and Product Market Competition: An Overview Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Giacinta Cestone () (GREMAQ, Université de Toulouse and Università Cattolica di Milano)
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This paper offers an overview of the main interactions between corporate financing decisions and product market competition. Financial policy may affect the market game in several ways. It can make a firm more or less vulnerable to predation, commit the firm to a particular market strategy, or convey signals to the firm's competitors. Financial policy matters also in that the decision to resort to a common lender can facilitate collusion among competing firms. Finally, an appropriate design of financial claims can commit the lender not to provide potential entrants with funding or expertise.
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Paper provided by Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy in its series CSEF Working Papers with number
18.
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Date of creation: 01 Apr 1999Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Giornale degli Economisti e Annali di Economia, 1999, vol. 58, pages 269-300Handle: RePEc:sef:csefwp:18Contact details of provider: Postal: I-80126 Napoli Phone: +39 081 - 675372 Fax: +39 081 - 675372 Email: Web page: http://www.csef.it/ More information through EDIRC
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Keywords: Capital Structure ; Product Markets ; Find related papers by JEL classification: G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
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references Cited by : (explanations , Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
Cestone, Giacinta & Fumagalli, Chiara, 2001.
"Internal Capital Markets, Cross-Subsidization and Product Market Competition ,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
2935, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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Acharya, Viral V & Gromb, Denis & Yorulmazer, Tanju, 2008.
"Imperfect Competition in the Inter-Bank Market for Liquidity as a Rationale for Central Banking ,"
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6984, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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