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Strategic Debt in Vertical Relationships

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Author Info
Gianni De Fraja
Claudio A. G. Piga

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Abstract

We study a vertical relationship between two firms, and we show that the extent of the downstream firm's borrowing affects the contract offered by the upstream firm. We establish a negative relationship between the level of debt and the downstream firm's probability of bankrupt. We also show that, unless the interest rate is very high, there exists a conflict of interest between the upstream and the downstream firm: the latter wants to take on more debt than the former would like it to.We interpret this finding as an explanation of the constraint imposed by franchisors on the debt level of their franchisees.

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Paper provided by Department of Economics, University of York in its series Discussion Papers with number 98/16.

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Handle: RePEc:yor:yorken:98/16

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Keywords: Contract Theory Capital Structure Franchise

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G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Capital and Ownership Structure

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Demsetz, Harold & Lehn, Kenneth, 1985. "The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(6), pages 1155-77, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Chevalier, Judith A, 1995. "Capital Structure and Product-Market Competition: Empirical Evidence from the Supermarket Industry," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(3), pages 415-35, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Sugato Bhattacharyya & Francine Lafontaine, 1995. "Double-Sided Moral Hazard and the Nature of Share Contracts," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 26(4), pages 761-781, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Jensen, Michael C, 1986. "Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(2), pages 323-29, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Kovenock, Dan & Phillips, Gordon M, 1997. "Capital Structure and Product Market Behavior: An Examination of Plant Exit and Investment Decisions," Review of Financial Studies, Oxford University Press for Society for Financial Studies, vol. 10(3), pages 767-803.
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  6. Showalter, Dean M, 1995. "Oligopoly and Financial Structure: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(3), pages 647-53, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Gal-Or, Esther, 1991. "Vertical Restraints with Incomplete Information," Journal of Industrial Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 39(5), pages 503-16, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Titman, Sheridan & Wessels, Roberto, 1988. " The Determinants of Capital Structure Choice," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 43(1), pages 1-19, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Mathewson, G Frank & Winter, Ralph A, 1985. "The Economics of Franchise Contracts," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 28(3), pages 503-26, October.
  10. Brander, James A & Spencer, Barbara J, 1989. "Moral Hazard and Limited Liability: Implications for the Theory of the Firm," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 30(4), pages 833-49, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. James A. Brander & Tracy R. Lewis, 1988. "Bankruptcy Costs and the Theory of Oligopoly," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 21(2), pages 221-43, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Friend, Irwin & Lang, Larry H P, 1988. " An Empirical Test of the Impact of Managerial Self-interest on Corporate Capital Structure," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 43(2), pages 271-81, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Marsh, Paul, 1982. " The Choice between Equity and Debt: An Empirical Study," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 37(1), pages 121-44, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Francine Lafontaine, 1992. "Agency Theory and Franchising: Some Empirical Results," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 23(2), pages 263-283, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Phillips, Gordon M., 1995. "Increased debt and industry product markets An empirical analysis," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(2), pages 189-238, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  1. Antonio Acconcia & Riccardo Martina & Salvatore Piccolo, 2005. "Vertical Restraints under Asymmetric Information: On the Role of Participation Constraints," CSEF Working Papers 141, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Salerno, Italy, revised 01 Jun 2006. [Downloadable!]
  2. Gianfranco Atzeni & Claudio Piga, 2005. "R&D investment, Credit Rationing and Sample Selection," Discussion Paper Series 2005_6, Department of Economics, Loughborough University, revised Jun 2005. [Downloadable!]
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