This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Fisheries Management with Multiple Market Failures

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Frank Jensen () (Institute of Local Government Studies, Denmark)
Niels Vestergaard () (Department of Environmental and Business Economics, University of Southern Denmark)

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

Within fisheries it is well-known that several market failures exist. However, fisheries economists analyse these market failures separately despite the fact that the market failures arise simultaneously. In this paper several market fail-ures that arise simultaneously are analysed. A resource stock tax and a tax on self-reported harvest are considered as a solution to problems associated with the stock externality, measuring individual catches and stock uncertainty. Within a fisheries economic model it is shown that it will be in the interest of risk-averse fishermen to report a part of their catch even without a control pol-icy. In addition, it is shown that this tax structure can secure optimal expected individual catches and simulations show that the tax payment is very low. Thus, the tax system may be useful in practical fisheries management.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.sdu.dk/~/media/Files/Om_SDU/Institutter/Miljo/ime/wp/vestergaard54.ashx
File Format: application/pdf
File Function: First version, 2004-02
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of Southern Denmark, Department of Environmental and Business Economics in its series Working Papers with number 54/04.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length: 50 pages
Date of creation: Feb 2004
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:sdk:wpaper:54

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Niels Bohrs Vej 9, 6700 Esbjerg
Phone: (+45) 6550 1000
Fax: (+45) 6550 1091
Email:
Web page: http://www.sam.sdu.dk/ime
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Ulla H. Oehlenschläger).

Related research
Keywords: Prices regulation; Quantity regulation; Asymmetric Information; Self-Reporting; Stock Tax and Harvest Tax;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
Q22 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Fishery
K4 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior
L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Xepapadeas, A. P., 1995. "Observability and choice of instrument mix in the control of externalities," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(3), pages 485-498, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Cabe, Richard & Herriges, Joseph A., 1992. "The regulation of non-point-source pollution under imperfect and asymmetric information," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 134-146, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Lars Gårn Hansen & Frank Jensen & Urs Steiner Brandt & Niels Vestergaard, 2006. "Illegal Landings: An Aggregate Catch Self-Reporting Mechanism," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, American Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 88(4), pages 974-985, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Andersen, Peder & Sutinen, Jon G., 1984. "Stochastic Bioeconomics: A Review of Basic Methods and Results," Marine Resource Economics, Marine Resources Foundation, vol. 1(2). [Downloadable!]
  5. Jensen, Frank & Vestergaard, Niels, 2002. "Moral hazard problems in fisheries regulation: the case of illegal landings and discard," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 281-299, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Frank Jensen & Niels Vestergaard, 2003. "Prices versus Quantities in Fisheries Models," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 79(3), pages 415-425. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Ragnar Arnason, 1990. "Minimum Information Management in Fisheries," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 23(3), pages 630-53, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Xepapadeas, A. P., 1991. "Environmental policy under imperfect information: Incentives and moral hazard," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 113-126, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? IDEAS is not the only service displaying RePEc data. Choose on RePEc which service fits your needs best.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-30.


This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.