Fisheries Management with Multiple Market Failures
AbstractWithin fisheries it is well-known that several market failures exist. However, fisheries economists analyse these market failures separately despite the fact that the market failures arise simultaneously. In this paper several market fail-ures that arise simultaneously are analysed. A resource stock tax and a tax on self-reported harvest are considered as a solution to problems associated with the stock externality, measuring individual catches and stock uncertainty. Within a fisheries economic model it is shown that it will be in the interest of risk-averse fishermen to report a part of their catch even without a control pol-icy. In addition, it is shown that this tax structure can secure optimal expected individual catches and simulations show that the tax payment is very low. Thus, the tax system may be useful in practical fisheries management.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Southern Denmark, Department of Environmental and Business Economics in its series Working Papers with number 54/04.
Length: 50 pages
Date of creation: Feb 2004
Date of revision:
Prices regulation; Quantity regulation; Asymmetric Information; Self-Reporting; Stock Tax and Harvest Tax;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- Q22 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Fishery
- K4 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
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