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Instrument choice when regulators are concerned about resource extinction

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  • Hansen, Lars Gårn
  • Jensen, Frank
  • Russell, Clifford

Abstract

In this paper we undertake a systematic investigation of instrument choice when preventing a population collapse rather than maximizing industry profit is the overriding concern. Contrary to what seems to be the general consensus we find that landing fees do provide more effective insurance against extinction than quotas under more or less the same conditions as those implying that landing fees are better at maximizing industry profit. Thus, the efficiency of the regulatory instrument mainly depends on the basic information asymmetries characterizing the fishery, and is not sensitive to whether the regulators total catch goals are set according to economic or precautionary principles.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Resource and Energy Economics.

Volume (Year): 35 (2013)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
Pages: 135-147

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Handle: RePEc:eee:resene:v:35:y:2013:i:2:p:135-147

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505569

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Keywords: Prices versus quantities; Resource extinction;

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References

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  1. Lars Gårn Hansen, 2008. "Prices versus Quantities in Fisheries Models: Comment," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 84(4), pages 708-711.
  2. Fischer, Carolyn & Laxminarayan, Ramanan, 2010. "Managing partially protected resources under uncertainty," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 129-141, March.
  3. Reed, William J., 1979. "Optimal escapement levels in stochastic and deterministic harvesting models," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 6(4), pages 350-363, December.
  4. Erwin Bulte & G. van Kooten, 1999. "Marginal Valuation of Charismatic Species: Implications for Conservation," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 14(1), pages 119-130, July.
  5. Lars G. Hansen & Frank Jensen & Clifford Russell, 2008. "The Choice of Regulatory Instrument When There Is Uncertainty About Compliance with Fisheries Regulations," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 90(4), pages 1130-1142.
  6. Frank Jensen & Niels Vestergaard, 2003. "Prices versus Quantities in Fisheries Models," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 79(3), pages 415-425.
  7. Colin W. Clark & Gordon R. Munro & U. Rashid Sumaila, 2010. "Limits to the Privatization of Fishery Resources," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 86(2), pages 209-218.
  8. Trond Bjørndal & Daniel Gordon & Veijo Kaitala & Marko Lindroos, 2004. "International Management Strategies for a Straddling Fish Stock: A Bio-Economic Simulation Model of the Norwegian Spring-Spawning Herring Fishery," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 29(4), pages 435-457, December.
  9. Rögnvaldur Hannesson & John Kenned, 2005. "Landing Fees versus Fish Quotas," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 81(4).
  10. Jensen, Frank & Vestergaard, Niels, 2002. "Moral hazard problems in fisheries regulation: the case of illegal landings and discard," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 281-299, November.
  11. Crowards, Tom M., 1998. "Safe Minimum Standards: costs and opportunities," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 303-314, June.
  12. Weitzman, Martin L., 2002. "Landing Fees vs Harvest Quotas with Uncertain Fish Stocks," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 43(2), pages 325-338, March.
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