Discretion rather than rules in multiple-species fisheries

This paper evaluates the bioeconomic performance of individual fishing quota (IFQ) regulations in multiple-species fisheries. In our model, a manager chooses the aggregate quotas under uncertainty over the true stock abundances of multiple, jointly-harvested fish species. Fishers conduct harvest operations under full knowledge of the species-specific productivities of their fishing gear. We derive the private profit maximizing mortalities and economic rent outcomes implemented by fishers under competing regulatory designs. We compare bioeconomic performance under an IFQ regulation with discretion over the mix of species that are harvested and an IFQ with rules that are imposed through a discard ban. Both regulations eliminate discards. Discretion reduces the information gap between the manager and fishers about uncertain stock abundances. Discretion better aligns fisher implemented outcomes with those preferred by management and raises expected fishery value. Incorporating discretion into regulatory designs provides new prospects for improving fisheries management.