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Uncertainty and asymmetric information: An overview

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  • Jensen, Frank

Abstract

This paper provides an overview of the literature on fisheries economics related to uncertainty and asymmetric information. It is argued that uncertainty is relevant in connection with present and future stock sizes and prices, while asymmetric information is important for cost functions, catches, catch per unit of effort, and effort. The literature on uncertainty and asymmetric information can be seen as providing the basis of an argument for using taxes in fisheries management. It is, therefore, surprising that over 55 countries regulate their fisheries with individual quotas, while taxes are not used at all.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Marine Policy.

Volume (Year): 32 (2008)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Pages: 89-103

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Handle: RePEc:eee:marpol:v:32:y:2008:i:1:p:89-103

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/marpol

Related research

Keywords: Asymmetric information Uncertainty Regulation;

References

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  1. Urs Steiner Brandt & Niels Vestergaard, 2006. "Illegal Landings: An Aggregate Catch Self-Reporting Mechanism," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 88(4), pages 974-985.
  2. Sethi, Gautam & Costello, Christopher & Fisher, Anthony C. & Hanemann, W. Michael & Karp, Larry, 2004. "Fishery Management Under Multiple Uncertainty," Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley, Working Paper Series qt8122f9d2, Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley.
  3. Frank Jensen & Niels Vestergaard, 2004. "Fisheries Management with Multiple Market Failures," Working Papers 54/04, University of Southern Denmark, Department of Environmental and Business Economics.
  4. Lars G. Hansen & Frank Jensen & Clifford Russell, 2008. "The Choice of Regulatory Instrument When There Is Uncertainty About Compliance with Fisheries Regulations," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 90(4), pages 1130-1142.
  5. Clark, Colin W. & Kirkwood, Geoffrey P., 1986. "On uncertain renewable resource stocks: Optimal harvest policies and the value of stock surveys," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 13(3), pages 235-244, September.
  6. Weitzman, Martin L., 2002. "Landing Fees vs Harvest Quotas with Uncertain Fish Stocks," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 43(2), pages 325-338, March.
  7. Andersen, Peder, 1982. "Commercial fisheries under price uncertainty," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 11-28, March.
  8. Sandmo, Agnar, 1971. "On the Theory of the Competitive Firm under Price Uncertainty," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 61(1), pages 65-73, March.
  9. Clark, Colin W. & Munro, Gordon R., 1975. "The economics of fishing and modern capital theory: A simplified approach," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 2(2), pages 92-106, December.
  10. Wilen, James E., 2000. "Renewable Resource Economists and Policy: What Differences Have We Made?," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 39(3), pages 306-327, May.
  11. Frank Jensen & Niels Vestergaard, 2003. "Prices versus Quantities in Fisheries Models," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 79(3), pages 415-425.
  12. Pindyck, Robert S, 1984. "Uncertainty in the Theory of Renewable Resource Markets," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 51(2), pages 289-303, April.
  13. Jon G. Sutinen & Peder Andersen, 1985. "The Economics of Fisheries Law Enforcement," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 64(4), pages 387-397.
  14. Parzival Copes, 1986. "A Critical Review of the Individual Quota as a Device in Fisheries Management," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 62(3), pages 278-291.
  15. Reed, William J., 1979. "Optimal escapement levels in stochastic and deterministic harvesting models," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 6(4), pages 350-363, December.
  16. Gary S. Becker, 1968. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 76, pages 169.
  17. Rögnvaldur Hannesson & John Kenned, 2005. "Landing Fees versus Fish Quotas," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 81(4).
  18. Danielsson, Asgeir, 2002. "Efficiency of Catch and Effort Quotas in the Presence of Risk," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 20-33, January.
  19. Frank Jensen & Niels Vestergaard, 2002. "A Principal-Agent Analysis of Fisheries," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 158(2), pages 276-, June.
  20. Anastasios Xepapadeas, . "Observability And Choice Of Instrument Mix In The Control Of Externalities," Working Papers 9401, University of Crete, Department of Economics.
  21. Jensen, Frank & Vestergaard, Niels, 2002. "Moral hazard problems in fisheries regulation: the case of illegal landings and discard," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 281-299, November.
  22. Ragnar Arnason, 1990. "Minimum Information Management in Fisheries," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 23(3), pages 630-53, August.
  23. Lars Hansen, 1998. "A Damage Based Tax Mechanism for Regulation of Non-Point Emissions," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 12(1), pages 99-112, July.
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