Very little principal-agent analysis has been done within the fisheries economic literature. This paper conducts a principal-agent analysis of fisheries. Within a standard principal-agent model, the low-cost agent must be allowed the same level of effort as under complete information. This conclusion does not hold for fisheries, because of a resource restriction and the fact that maximisation takes place over two variables. By means of comparative-static analysis, this paper argues that the low-cost agent must be allowed a larger effort than under complete information.
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Find related papers by JEL classification: D2 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations Q2 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation L5 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy
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Urs Steiner Brandt & Frank Jensen & Lars Gårn Hansen & Niels Vestergaard, 2004.
"Ratcheting in Renewable Resources Contracting,"
Working Papers
58/04, University of Southern Denmark, Department of Environmental and Business Economics.
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